

THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE

(shorter version)

by Allen W. Dulles

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
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Allen W. Dulles

FEW BOOKS have been so long awaited as Allen Dulles' *The Craft of Intelligence*.

Since the renowned international lawyer, diplomat and authority on intelligence resigned as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1961, editors and publishers have besieged his Washington home urging him to write this book.

Britannica's *Book of the Year* was the fortunate winner in this free-for-all.

The Craft of Intelligence is the work of the one man in the world probably best qualified to write this story of cloak-and-dagger and less romantic operations in the international area of espionage, counterespionage, propaganda and kindred activities.

Member of a distinguished family which included three secretaries of state, the last of these his late brother, John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles has traveled widely. His first job after graduation from Princeton was in the educational field in India.

Then came the U.S. diplomatic service, the peace delegation in Paris after World War I with Pres. Woodrow Wilson, other international conferences and in the mid-1920s entrance into the private practice of law with the famed firm of Sullivan and Cromwell.

World War II interrupted his legal career. He was immediately tapped for the U.S. Office of Strategic Services and spent most of the war years, until the end of 1945, in Switzerland as the top OSS operational officer on the continent.

After a few years of private law practice he returned to intelligence with the CIA in 1951 and after two years as deputy director served as director of the agency for almost nine years. In keeping with security practices, he made few public utterances during this period.

Now he adds to three earlier books this authoritative study of intelligence. Nothing quite like it, nothing so authoritative and comprehensive, has before been published.

THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE

By ALLEN W. DULLES

I. INTELLIGENCE COMES OF AGE

In our time the United States is being challenged by a hostile group of nations that profess a philosophy of life and of government inimical to our own. This in itself is not a new development; we have faced such challenges before. What has changed is that now, for the first time, we face an adversary possessing the military power to mount a devastating attack directly upon the United States, and in the era of nuclear missiles this can be accomplished in a matter of minutes or hours with a minimum of prior alert.

To be sure, we possess the same power against our adversary. But in our free society our defenses and deterrents are prepared in a largely open fashion, while our antagonists have built up a formidable wall of secrecy and security. In order to bridge this gap and help to provide for strategic warning, we have to rely more and more upon our intelligence operations.

Another change is that we have had to assume the responsibility of leadership for the countries of the Free World. Accompanying this responsibility is a burden of unprecedented dimensions placed upon both our policies and our measures for military preparedness. As a result, our intelligence services have had to equip themselves for an expanding range of problems unlike any they have ever faced before.

This report concerns itself with how our intelligence services have been developing and what they must be equipped to do in this age of peril.

In the past, in wartime, our military commanders have had military intelligence services available to them. Nevertheless, during World War I we still found ourselves inadequately prepared for our intelligence responsibilities, despite the high degree of competence and devotion of a small group of able army and navy intelligence officers. It was only in World War II and particularly after the Pearl Harbor attack that we began to develop, side by side with our military intelligence organizations, an agency for secret intelligence collection and operations. The origin of this agency was a summons by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to William J. Donovan in 1941 to come down to Washington and work on this problem. The result was an organization known as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

Colonel (later Major General) Donovan is generally regarded as the father of modern U.S. intelligence. He was eminently qualified for the job. A distinguished lawyer, a veteran of World War I with the distinction of having won the Medal of Honor, he had divided his busy life in peacetime between the law, govern-

ment service and politics. He knew the world, having traveled widely. He understood people. He had a flair for the unusual and for the dangerous, tempered with judgment. In short, he had the qualities to be desired in an intelligence officer.

The Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor and our entry into the war naturally stimulated the rapid growth of the OSS and its intelligence operations. It was just after Pearl Harbor that I was recruited by General Donovan, who had been a close friend of mine for many years. I served with him until the end of the war in 1945.

For a short time after V-J Day, it looked as though the U.S. would gradually withdraw its troops from Europe and the Far East. This would probably have included the disbanding of intelligence operations. In fact, it seemed likely at the end of 1945 that we would do what we did after World War I—fold our tents and go back to business-as-usual. But this time, in contrast to 1919 when we repudiated the League of Nations, we became a charter member of the United Nations and gave it our support in hopes that it would grow up to be the keeper of world peace.

Communists Overplayed Hand

If the Communists had not overreached themselves, our government might well have been disposed to leave the responsibility for keeping the peace more and more to the United Nations. In fact, at Yalta Stalin asked President Roosevelt how long we expected to keep our troops in Europe. The President answered, not more than two years. In view of the events that took place in rapid succession during the postwar years, it is clear that in the period between 1945 and 1950 Premier Stalin and Mao Tse-tung decided that they would not wait for us to retire gracefully from Europe and Asia; they would kick us out.

Moscow installed Communist regimes in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria before the ink was dry on the agreements signed at Yalta and Potsdam. The Kremlin threatened Iran in 1946 and followed this in rapid succession by imposing a Communist regime on Hungary, activating the civil war in Greece, staging the take-over of Czechoslovakia and instituting the Berlin blockade. Later, in 1950, Mao joined Stalin to mastermind the attack on South Korea. Meanwhile Mao had been consolidating his position on the mainland of China. These blows in different parts of the world aroused our leaders to the need for a world-wide intelligence system. We were, without fully realizing it, witnessing the first stages of a master plan to shatter the societies of Europe



United Press International
William J. Donovan (left) visiting a military school in Sofia, Bulgaria, in Feb. 1941 in his capacity as personal representative of Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt. At right, Gen. Nihoff, head of the school

and Asia and isolate the United States, and eventually to take over the entire world.

In his address to Congress on March 12, 1947, President Truman declared that the security of the country was threatened by Communist actions and stated that it would be our policy

to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements seeking to impose on them totalitarian regimes.

He added that we could not allow changes in the status quo brought about by "coercion or by such subterfuges as political infiltration," in violation of the United Nations charter.

It was by then obvious that the United Nations, shackled by the Soviet veto, could not play the role of policeman. It was also clear that we had a long period of crisis ahead of us. Under these conditions, a series of measures were taken by the government to transform our words into action. One of the earliest was the reorganization of our national defense structure, which provided for the unification of the military services under a secretary of defense and the creation of the National Security Council.

At that time President Truman, basing his action upon a blueprint that General Donovan had submitted, recommended that a central intelligence agency be created as a permanent agency of government. A Republican Congress agreed and, with complete bipartisan approval, the CIA was established in the National Security Act of 1947. It was an openly acknowledged arm of the executive branch of government although, of course, it had many duties of a secret nature. President Truman saw to it that the new agency was equipped to support our government's effort to meet Communist tactics of "coercion, subterfuge, and political infiltration." Much of the know-how and some of the personnel of the OSS were taken over by the Central Intelligence Agency. Fortunately many ranking officers of the OSS had remained in various interim intelligence units which had functioned under the aegis of the State and War departments in the period 1945-47.

I have spent more than ten years with the Central Intelligence Agency, eight as its director. During World War II I served

Allen Dulles, retiring after eight years as director of the CIA, received the National Security medal from Pres. John F. Kennedy, who went to Langley, Va., Nov. 28, 1961, to open the new CIA headquarters building



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A meeting of the U.S. Intelligence board, a group of military and civilian advisers to the CIA, with Allen Dulles at the head of the table

with the OSS, and even earlier, during my years in the diplomatic service (1916-26), I was often engaged in the gathering of intelligence. Since returning to private life in 1961, I have felt strongly that someone—even though he be a deeply-concerned advocate—should tell what properly can be told about intelligence as a vital element in the structure of government. Probably intelligence is the least understood and the most misrepresented of the professions. Many books and articles, thrillers that are more fictional than factual, have been written over recent years about “spy” work. From them the general reader must have drawn some strange conclusions as to the real purposes and activities of our intelligence service.

When, on November 28, 1961, President Kennedy came out to inaugurate the new CIA headquarters building and to say goodbye to me as director, he expressed one reason why this misunderstanding exists: “Your successes are unheralded, your failures are trumpeted.” For obviously one cannot tell of operations that go along well. Those that go badly generally speak for themselves. The President then added a word of encouragement to the several thousand men and women of CIA:

... but I am sure you realize how important is your work, how essential it is—and in the long sweep of history how significant your efforts will be judged. So I do want to express my appreciation to you now, and I am confident that in the future you will continue to merit the appreciation of our country, as you have in the past.

It is hardly reasonable to expect proper understanding and support for our intelligence work in this country if only the insiders, a few people within the executive and legislative branches, know anything whatever about the CIA, and all others continue to draw their knowledge from the so-called inside stories by writers who have never been on the inside.

There are, of course, sound reasons for not divulging any intelligence secrets. It is well to remember that what is told to the public also gets to the enemy. However, the discipline and techniques—what we call the tradecraft of intelligence—are

widely known in the profession, whatever the nationality of the service may be. A discussion of this reveals no secrets. What must not be disclosed, and will not be disclosed here, is where and how and when the precise means of the tradecraft are being or will be employed in particular operations.

The CIA is not an underground organization. One need only read the law to get a general idea of what it is set up to do. A guiding principle of mine when I was Director of Central Intelligence was always to keep secret, by every human means, only those activities which should be secret, and not to make a mystery out of what is a matter of common knowledge or is obvious to friend and foe alike.

Futile Secrecy

Shortly after I became director I was presented with a good illustration of the futility of certain kinds of secrecy. Dr. Milton Eisenhower, brother of the President, had an appointment to see me on some matter of mutual interest relating to the field of education. The President volunteered to drop him off at my office. They started out, I gather, without forewarning to the Secret Service and were unable to find the CIA headquarters until a telephone call had been put through for precise directions. This led me to investigate the reasons for a secrecy surrounding my location that was quite futile—the agency was, after all, listed in the telephone book with its proper number and address, and many cab drivers in Washington knew its location. But the gate outside our headquarters bore only the sign “Government Printing Office,” which in fact had a shop on the premises. I learned that the sightseeing buses going around Washington were making it a practice to stop outside our front gate. The guide would harangue the sightseers to the effect that behind the barbed wire before them was the most secret, the most concealed place in Washington—the headquarters of the U.S. spy organization, the Central Intelligence Agency.

As soon as I had a proper sign placed outside our headquarters, the glamour and mystery disappeared. We were no longer either sinister or mysterious to visitors to the capital—we became just another government office.

When we try to make a mystery out of everything relating to intelligence, we tend to scatter those efforts and energies which should properly be directed toward maintaining the secrecy and security of operations where they are essential to success. Each situation has to be considered according to the facts, keeping in mind the principle of withholding from a potential enemy all useful information about secret intelligence operations or personnel engaged in them. The injunction that George Washington wrote to Colonel Elias Dayton on July 26, 1777, is still applicable to many intelligence operations today:

The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged. All that remains for me to add, is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in most Enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned and promising a favourable issue.

On the whole, Americans are inclined to talk too much about matters which should be classified. I feel that we hand out too many of our secrets, particularly in the field of military "hardware" and weaponry, and that we often fail to make the vital distinction between the type of things that should be secret and those which, by their very nature, are not and cannot be kept secret. Also, there are times when our press is overzealous in seeking "scoops" with regard to future diplomatic, political and military moves. We have learned the importance of secrecy in time of war, although even then there have been serious indiscretions at times. But it is well to recognize that in the "Cold War" our adversary takes every advantage of what we divulge openly or make publicly available.

To be sure, in our form of government, given the attitude of the public and the press, it is impossible to erect a wall around the whole business, nor do I suggest that this be done. Neither Congress nor the executive branch intended this when the law of 1947 was passed. Furthermore, certain information must be given out if public confidence in the intelligence mission is to be strengthened and if the profession of the intelligence officer is to be properly appreciated.

Most important of all, it is necessary that both those on the inside—the workers in intelligence—and the public should come to share in the conviction that intelligence operations can help mightily to protect the nation.

II. THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

Does the United States need a central intelligence service? This question has often been asked me. The inquirer then goes on to point out that the Departments of State and Defense have their own intelligence resources. Officers of the U.S. Foreign Service and various military attachés do collect information and these two departments have their intelligence experts who analyze incoming data. In general these people are well qualified and do a good job. Are not their accomplishments sufficient to our needs?

The answer given to this question in our time by both the executive and legislative branches of government has been in the negative; Congress passed the legislation establishing the Central Intelligence Agency and the President signed the bill. No effort has been made to repeal this legislation, for the character of the Communist threat has made it necessary, even crucial, to our survival. The Soviet Union, Communist China and the entire Communist bloc surround all their activities, both of a military nature and of the sort we term subversive, with a wall of secrecy and security. The intelligence collection work of the State

and Defense departments, although of great value, is not enough.

Then, in addition to getting the information, there is also the question of how it should be processed and analyzed. I feel that there are good reasons for placing the main burden of responsibility for preparation and co-ordination of our intelligence analyses upon a centralized agency of government that has no responsibility for policy. Quite naturally policy makers tend to become wedded to the policy for which they are responsible, and State and Defense employees are no exception to this very human tendency. They are likely to view with a jaundiced eye intelligence reports that might include elements casting doubt upon the wisdom of existing policy decisions. The most serious occupational hazard we have in the intelligence field, the one that causes more mistakes than any foreign deception or intrigue, is prejudice. I grant that we are all creatures of prejudice, but by entrusting intelligence co-ordination to our central intelligence service, which is excluded from policy making, we can avoid, to the greatest possible extent, the bending of facts obtained through intelligence to suit a particular point of view.

At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack many high officials here and abroad were convinced that the Japanese, if they initiated hostilities in the Pacific, would strike southward against the "soft underbelly" of the British, French and Dutch colonial areas. The likelihood that they would make the initial attack directly upon their most dangerous antagonist, the United States, was discounted. The Pearl Harbor attack was a classic instance in which intelligence evaluation was not handled objectively. It undoubtedly influenced later decisions concerning the organization of our intelligence service.

Broad Range of Problems

Furthermore, both the State and Defense departments these days have a vast range of absorbing problems to deal with—in forming policy, planning for a wide variety of contingencies, and implementing their policies in action. To burden them also with the major responsibility for gathering and evaluating intelligence would tend to subordinate that function to their other roles and reduce the importance of the task an intelligence service must perform.

That task is to provide the makers of our foreign policy—primarily the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, but including others in government strictly on a "need-to-know" basis—with information on what is going on and what are the likely future developments in the world about us. Any information from any source that bears on the security of the United States lies within the scope of the intelligence service. Of course, particular emphasis is placed on information about the countries whose policies are hostile to us, namely the Communist bloc. We must know as much as possible about their power and their plans, about the types of military "hardware" they are developing, particularly the missiles, nuclear bombs, aircraft and the other elements of their offensive strength which they could bring to bear upon us and our allies.

If anyone has any doubt about the importance of obtaining objective intelligence, I would suggest that he merely study the mistakes political leaders have made in the past because they were badly advised or because they misjudged the facts and therefore the attitudes of other countries. When Kaiser Wilhelm II ordered the invasion of France by way of Belgium in 1914, he had been persuaded by his military leaders that the violation of Belgian neutrality was essential to military success. But he relied too heavily on the judgment of these same military men, who were reasonably sure, on military grounds, that England would not enter the war on behalf of the Belgians. The Kaiser had received ample warning from the political side and his decision represented a gross failure to appraise the available

intelligence objectively.

The days leading up to World War II were filled with similar examples. Disregarding Churchill's warnings and various intelligence sources, the British failed to comprehend both the intentions and the growing military capabilities of Nazi Germany. They especially underestimated Germany's striking power through the air. Hitler likewise made a series of miscalculations. After France had fallen and most of the Continent was in German hands, he discounted the strength and determination of Britain to hold out much longer and opened a second front against Russia in June 1941. Also, when he was advised of the plan for a U.S.-British landing in North Africa in 1942, he reportedly refused to pay attention to the available intelligence. I have been told that he remarked casually, "They don't have the ships to do it." In our own case, the warnings the United States received prior to Pearl Harbor may not have been clear enough to permit the President and his military advisers to pinpoint the attack on Hawaii and the Philippines; but, had they been adequately analyzed, they would have alerted us to the imminent danger of sudden attack somewhere in the Pacific. As for Japan, successful as was the Pearl Harbor attack, its government proved later to have made the greatest miscalculation of all when it underestimated United States military potential.

Today's intelligence service finds itself in the situation of having to maintain a constant watch in every part of the world, no matter what may at the moment be occupying the main attention of diplomats and military men. Our vital interests are subject to attack in almost every quarter of the globe at any time.

Unpredictable Involvements

A few decades ago no one would have been able or willing to predict that in the 1960s our armed forces would be stationed in Korea and be deeply engaged in South Vietnam (how many of us even knew the latter existed?), or that Cuba would have become a hostile Communist state closely allied with Moscow, or that the Congo would have assumed grave importance in our foreign policy. Yet these are all facts of life today. The coming years will undoubtedly provide equally strange developments.

Today it is impossible to predict where the next danger spot may develop. It is the duty of intelligence to forewarn of such dangers, so that the government can take action. No longer can the search for information be limited to a few countries. The whole world is the arena of our conflict. In this age of nuclear missiles even the Arctic and the Antarctic have become areas of strategic significance. Distance has lost much of its old significance, while time, in strategic terms, is counted in hours or even minutes. The oceans, which even in World War II protected this country and allowed it ample time to prepare for eventual participation, are still where they have always been. But now they can be crossed by missiles in a matter of minutes and by bombers in a few hours. Today the United States is in the front line of attack, for it is the main target of its adversaries. No longer does an attack require a long period of mobilization with its telltale evidence. Missiles stand ready on their launchers, and bombers are on the alert.

Therefore, an intelligence service today has an additional responsibility, for it cannot wait for evidences of the likelihood of hostile acts against us until after the decision to strike has been made by another power. Our government must be both forewarned and forearmed. The situation becomes all the more complicated when, as in the case of Korea and Vietnam, a provocative attack is directed not against the U.S. but against some distant overseas area which, if lost to the Free World, would imperil our own security. Obviously, then, the very nature of the intelligence service has changed radically in the past two decades.

The extraordinary security precautions taken by the U.S.S.R. and Communist China are excellent testimony to this change. Great areas of both countries are officially sealed off from foreign eyes. The information that these countries release about their military establishment is carefully controlled and patently misleading, and yet accurate knowledge is needed for our defense and for defense of the Free World. The Soviet Union has so far refused to permit the inspection and control that are essential for nuclear and conventional arms limitations. The Communist nations brazenly assert that this secrecy is a great military asset and an element of basic policy. As in Cuba, they arm in secret in order to be able to attack in secret, as they did in Korea. In 1955 the U.S.S.R. refused the "open skies" proposal of President Eisenhower, which we were prepared to have applied to our country on the same terms as to their own. It is the task of the U.S. intelligence service to right the uneven balance of essential knowledge about military capabilities and their preparation; to do so it has no other choice than to break through the Communists' shield of secrecy.

United States as Leader

The United States has been forced by the course of events, particularly by the aggressive tactics of the Soviet Union, to assume a role of leadership in the Free World. Not only do we have formal allies, but there are many other friendly nations who share our view of the Communist threat. Our partners in the Free World are making a real contribution to the West's total strength, and this includes contributions in matters of intelligence that help keep the Free World forewarned. However, some of our friends lack the resources to develop an effective intelligence organization, and they look to the United States to play a major role in this field and to advise them if we uncover hostile plans against them. It is in our interest to do so. One of the most gratifying features of my work has been the co-operation established between the U.S. intelligence service and its counterparts throughout the world who make common cause with us in uncovering aggressive moves of the Communists.

There is another side of the coin in intelligence work, known most commonly as counterintelligence, devoted to warding off the vigorous onslaught of espionage emanating largely from Communist nations and aimed at penetrating our most important secrets in the fields of national defense and foreign policy.

Red Espionage Formidable

In the Soviet Union, we are faced with an antagonist who has raised the art of espionage to an unprecedented height, while developing the collateral techniques of subversion, deception and penetration into a formidable political instrument of attack. No other country has ever before attempted espionage on such a scale. These operations have gone on in times of the so-called thaw with the same vigour as in times of acute crisis. We have the task of ferreting out and "neutralizing" hostile agents and hostile activities that present a common danger to us and to our allies and friends, and we also must keep our allies and friends alerted.

The fact that so many Soviet spy cases have been uncovered recently in several NATO countries is not due to mere chance. It is well that the world should know what the Soviets know already, namely, that the free countries of the world have been developing increasingly sophisticated counterintelligence organizations and have become more and more effective over the years in uncovering Soviet espionage. Naturally, in all of our formal alliances we have a direct interest in the internal security arrangements of countries that may share some of our military secrets. If a NATO document is filched from one of our NATO allies, it is just as harmful to us as if it had been stolen from our own files. Herein

lies one of the pressing reasons for co-operation in counterintelligence work.

No matter how much accurate intelligence it collects or how efficient is its counterintelligence capability, an intelligence service is not fulfilling its purpose unless it can serve a third and extremely important function. This consists of analyzing the intelligence and reaching judgments or estimates on the basis of all information, both overt and secret, available on any subject of importance to the national security. In the United States this process is generally referred to as the production of national estimates, in which all the various U.S. intelligence groups participate under the leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence.

The President Always Reachable

There is one aspect of intelligence work that may seem rather mechanical, but nevertheless presents some very real and practical problems. This is the matter of getting intelligence to its "consumers" in a manner that will ensure prompt and thorough consideration of its implications for policy. At the present time the responsibilities for this procedure have been clearly fixed. I believe this is one of the major improvements realized through the CIA.

Arrangements have been made so that the President and other senior officers of government, as required, can be instantly reached by the Director of Central Intelligence or by their own intelligence officers. Experience over the years has proved that this system really works. I don't recall a single instance, during my service as director of the CIA, when I failed to reach the President in a matter of minutes with any item of intelligence I felt was of immediate importance. Today, it is a rare occasion indeed when an important policy decision pertaining to foreign affairs is made without an intelligence estimate first having been submitted covering the essential considerations involved.

These are the things an intelligence service in a free society should do, but there are others it should not do that are equally important to understand. First, as has already been implied, an intelligence service should have a clear understanding of its relation to policy decisions. It should not consider itself a policy-making organization, despite the fact that an intelligence estimate and the conclusions in it may, and often do, have considerable influence on what policy is finally adopted. This proper function of intelligence has given rise to the mistaken charge that intelligence is meddling in policy. If the intelligence officer proposes policy or colours his conclusions in order to influence policy decisions he is acting improperly. Everything in the present mechanism of intelligence reporting and the preparation of estimates guards against this happening.

We Have No Secret Police

There is another rule which an intelligence service in a free society should follow scrupulously: it should never become involved in domestic security matters. In totalitarian systems the intelligence function is often combined with internal security operations, which include the liquidation of so-called "enemies of the state" at home or abroad. Such was the case with Himmler's Gestapo, the secret police in Japan under the militarists, and the Russian security services under the tsars as well as during the Communist regime. This warped use of the intelligence apparatus and the wide notoriety it has obtained has tended to confuse many people about the true functions of an intelligence service in a free society. Moreover, there have been many instances—most conspicuously in Latin America—in which dictators have converted authentic intelligence services into private gestapos for maintaining their rule.

In this country, under the law, CIA has no police powers what-

soever. It is, however, responsible for the security investigation of its own employees and for the physical security of its own installations. The spheres of operation of the Central Intelligence Agency on the one hand and of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the other are quite distinct. Naturally, there must always be close co-operation between the two organizations, particularly in the matter of sharing information pertaining to Communist espionage, for such information is acquired both at home and abroad.

Once having clearly in mind the chief functions of intelligence services in the Free World, one is able to look at the details—the day-to-day operations of the service—in the proper perspective. But first one should have at least a brief view of the role intelligence has played in history.

III. INTELLIGENCE IN ITS HISTORICAL SETTING

The history of intelligence activities is probably as old as the rivalries between sovereign nations or communities. So long as there is a need to protect vital interests and to promote the power and welfare of a state or ruler, there is also a need for intelligence. Thus the first instances of its use may be drawn from the earliest recorded events.

Indeed it even has its place in mythology. The god Apollo became enamoured of Cassandra, daughter of Priam of Troy, and bestowed on her the ability to see into the future. With this gift, her intelligence activities were worth more than those of any number of conventional spies, and she turned in accurate "estimates" of the consequences of abducting Helen to Troy and of accepting the "Greek gift" of the Trojan horse. But Apollo, after he had been rebuffed by Cassandra, added the proviso that her prophecies should not be believed. Hence her intelligence forecasts were disregarded. The result was the fall of Troy. While not all intelligence officers have suffered the same fate as Cassandra, it is a commonplace of history that intelligence is all too often disregarded or not even solicited.

Moses Sent Forth Spies

The Bible contains accounts of several intelligence operations, one of the earliest of which appears in chapter 13 of Numbers. While Moses was in the wilderness with the Children of Israel, he was directed by the Lord to send a ruler of each of the 12 tribes "to spy out the land of Canaan," which had been designated as their home. Moses gave them instructions to "see the land, what it is; and the people that dwelleth therein, whether they be strong or weak, few or many." And "so they went up, and searched the land." They spent 40 days on their mission and returned bearing grapes and pomegranates and figs as well as the report, "surely it floweth with milk and honey, and this is the fruit of it." But 10 of the 12 members of the mission (Joshua and Caleb dissenting) submitted that the military outlook was bleak, that the Canaanites were "men of a great stature" and "the cities . . . walled and very great." This report so discouraged the Israelites that they "murmured against Moses and against Aaron." The Lord then decreed that because of the little faith that the people had shown in him, they "should wander in the wilderness forty years."

This particular intelligence mission had been doomed from the start, and was obviously simply a means to test the faith of the Israelites. Instead of a few technicians, an unwieldy number of political leaders had been dispatched to do the job. Here was an obvious case of allowing policy makers to impose their prejudices upon the intelligence picture. But after the 40 years had expired a more successful operation took place when Joshua sent out two men to "spy secretly," and they were received in Jericho in the

house of Rahab the harlot (Josh. 2). This is, I believe, the first instance on record of what is now called in the intelligence trade a "safe house." Rahab concealed the spies and got them safely out of the city with their intelligence. The Israelites conquered Jericho "and utterly destroyed it and its people except that Rahab and her family were saved." Thus was established the tradition that those who help the intelligence process should be rewarded.

Throughout ancient history, from Cyrus the Great to Alexander the Great to the Roman Caesars, the effective use of intelligence and espionage was a hallmark of the exploits of a successful military leader. Mithradates VI, the king of Pontus, fought the power of Rome to a standstill in Asia Minor, in part because he had become an outstanding intelligence officer in his own right. He mastered 22 languages and dialects and knew the local tribes and their customs far better than did the Roman conquerors.

During the Middle Ages, due as much to the fragmented political situation as to the difficulties of transportation, supply and mobilization, it was impossible to attain strategic surprise in military campaigns. It took weeks, even months, to assemble an army, and even when the force had been collected, it could move only a few miles a day. Sea-borne expeditions could move somewhat more unobtrusively, but the massing of ships was difficult to conceal. For example, in 1066 King Harold of England had all the essential intelligence long before William the Conqueror landed at Hastings. He had been in Normandy himself and had seen the Norman army in action. He knew that William was planning an attack; he estimated the planned embarkation date and landing place with great accuracy; and, judging by the size of the force he concentrated, he made a very good guess about the number of William's troops. His defeat was not due to strategic intelligence deficiencies. He lost, rather, because his troops were battle-weary, sick and exhausted after a long forced march.

Medieval Europe in the Dark

A more organized kind of strategic intelligence collection was needed when western Europeans came into conflict with people outside their own area. They were not very well informed about the Byzantine Empire and the Eastern Slavs; they knew even less of the Muslim world, and they were almost completely ignorant of anything that went on in Central and East Asia. Emperor Frederick II (1212-1250) tried to keep up contacts with Muslim rulers (and was denounced as a heretic for his pains) and Louis IX of France (1226-1270) sent emissaries to the Mongols. Marco Polo's famous book about China contained material that would have been useful for strategic intelligence, but no one looked at it in that light. Throughout most of the Middle Ages Italian merchants did obtain considerable information about the East; unfortunately, they seldom had a chance to pass it on to the people who determined Europe's policies in that direction.

The most serious political mistakes of western Europe in the Middle Ages were made in relation to the East, due in large part to inadequate intelligence collection. European rulers consistently weakened Byzantium, instead of supporting it as a bulwark against invasion. They failed to recognize both the dangers and the opportunities created by the Mongol drive to the west. They underestimated the Turkish threat during the period when the Ottomans were consolidating their power. Given their prejudices, they might have made the same mistakes even if they had had better intelligence support, but without it they had almost no chance of making correct decisions.

In the fifteenth century the Italians made an important contribution to intelligence collection by establishing permanent embassies abroad. The envoys of Venice were especially adept at obtaining strategic intelligence. Many of their reports were of a very high quality, full of accurate observations and shrewd judg-

ments. Not only did permanent embassies provide for this kind of observation, but they also provided bases from which to establish regular networks of espionage. By the sixteenth century, most European governments were following the example of the Italian city-states.

Because map making was an almost unknown art in earlier times, an important item of intelligence was information on local geography. Knowledge of a river ford might allow an army to escape encirclement; discovery of a mountain path could show the way past a strong enemy position. Local inhabitants could usually be induced to give this kind of information, and Louis IX gave a large reward to a Bedouin who showed him where to cross a branch of the Nile, thereby enabling him to stage a surprise attack upon a Muslim army. Louis' son turned a strong defensive position in the Pyrenees by buying information about a little-used route through the mountains. Better known is the incident in the Crécy campaign when Edward III was nearly hemmed in by a large French army. A shepherd showed him a ford across the Somme, and Edward not only escaped pursuit but also obtained such a strong defensive position that he was able to break the French army when it finally attacked.

When European politics became more sophisticated with the rise of nationalism, the first specialists began to appear on the scene—ministers and secretaries of cabinet who devoted much time to organizing the collection of secret information. In England there were Sir Francis Walsingham and Lord Burghley for Queen Elizabeth I, John Thurloe for Cromwell. In France there was a long series of police "lieutenants," running from the days of Louis XIII and Richelieu to Napoleon. The Minister of Police for the latter, the notorious Joseph Fouché, directed political espionage to uncover the plottings of Jacobins, royalists and *émigrés* both at home and abroad.

Sir Francis Walsingham, who combined diplomacy with espionage in the service of Queen Elizabeth I
Culver Pictures, Inc.



One of the great intelligence services of the nineteenth century in Europe was that maintained not by a government, but by a private firm, the banking house of Rothschild. In promoting their employers' financial interests from headquarters in Frankfurt-am-Main, London, Paris, Vienna and Naples, the Rothschild agents were often able to gain vital intelligence before governments did. In 1815, while Europe awaited news of the Battle of Waterloo, Nathan Rothschild in London already knew that the British had been victorious. In order to make a financial killing, he then depressed the market by selling British government securities; those who watched his every move in the market did likewise, concluding that Waterloo had been lost by the British and their allies. At the proper moment he bought back in at the low, and when the news was finally generally known, the value of government securities naturally soared.

Disraeli's Suez Coup

Sixty years later Lionel Rothschild, a descendant of Nathan, on one historic evening had Disraeli as his dinner guest. During the meal a secret message came to Lionel that a controlling interest in the Suez Canal Company, owned by the Khedive of Egypt, was for sale. The Prime Minister was intrigued with the idea, but the equivalent of about \$44,000,000 was required to make the purchase. In the absence of Parliament, he could not get it quickly. So Lionel bought the shares for the British government, enabling Disraeli to pull off one of the great coups of his career. It was rumoured that some of the Rothschild "scoops" were obtained by use of carrier pigeons. There was probably little basis for the rumour, although it is true that one of the Rothschilds, immobilized in Paris when the city was surrounded by Germans in the Franco-German War of 1870, used balloons and

possibly also carrier pigeons to communicate with the outside world. The world heard of the armistice ending the war through this means, rather than through conventional news channels.

Prussian espionage in the nineteenth century is perhaps the first that can be credited with a mass organization. Previously espionage had made use largely of a few highly-placed individuals. In preparing for the campaigns against both Austria in 1866 and France in 1870, Prussian intelligence, directed by Wilhelm Stieber, enlisted the services of hundreds of low-level informants in the countries Prussia intended to attack.

In United States history, only in wartime has there been much evidence of government intelligence activity, at least until recent times. George Washington fortunately possessed a keen understanding of the value and methods of secret intelligence and of the need for keeping such activities utterly secret—so secret, in fact, that we may never have the full history of his intelligence operations. The most famous incident of American spying (and unsuccessful spying at that) in the Revolution is of course the story of Nathan Hale, but there is some evidence that the unfortunate outcome of this episode is exactly what drew Washington's attention to the need for more professional and dependable secret intelligence operations. Washington's financial accountings show that he spent around \$17,000, a lot of money in those days, on secret intelligence and that one of his main targets, where he kept a complex network of agents and couriers, was the New York area. Many supposed Tories with access to British headquarters there were really secret agents of General Washington. Of the many battles in which intelligence played an important role in the Revolution, the Battle of Saratoga, the turning point of the war, was by far the most outstanding.

Civil War Activity

During the Civil War, of course, both sides were intensely engaged in intelligence activities, particularly espionage. A civil war always presents difficult problems for the counterintelligence officer. Each side has little difficulty in finding spies and agents whose speech, appearance, and mode of living are identical with those of the enemy. Almost the only way to uncover a spy under these circumstances is to apprehend him *in flagrante*.

Nevertheless, just prior to and during the opening phase of the Civil War our federal government had a dearth of organized intelligence facilities. Then certain intelligence and security work was farmed out to the private Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, originally hired only to guard the person of President Lincoln and to run down plots against him and his Cabinet. In the early days of the war, Pinkerton men were also watching nearby Virginia for signs of sabotage, uprisings, and military action that would have isolated and paralyzed the city of Washington. In later years Mr. Pinkerton's agency was to become a famous detective organization in this country, specializing in protection of industrial properties. At that time, however, his men were pinch-hitting in jobs which today are part of the duties of three quite distinct government organizations: the Secret Service (guarding the President), the FBI (dealing with domestic counterespionage), and the CIA (collecting foreign intelligence).

When the United States entered World War I, initially it had to rely largely on the French and British for tactical and strategic intelligence. But we learned rapidly—due largely to a group of officers to whom I wish to pay tribute. There was, first of all, Colonel Ralph H. Van Deman, who is considered by many to be the moving force in establishing a U.S. military intelligence. His work is described in what I consider the best account by an American author of intelligence services through the ages, *The Story of Secret Service*, by Richard Wilmer Rowan. I worked personally with Colonel Van Deman in World War I when I was in Bern, and I can attest to the effective work that he and his

Maj. Allan Pinkerton (left), who organized an espionage system for the U.S. during the Civil War, photographed with Pres. Abraham Lincoln and Maj. Gen. J. A. McClelland at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac in Oct. 1862
United Press International



successors, General **Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000100170005-7** Churchill, performed in establishing the basis for our military intelligence today.

The British and French, the Germans, and later the Italians, entered World War II with highly developed secret intelligence organizations in addition to military intelligence services. During the war years when I was with the OSS, I had the privilege of working with the British service and developed close personal and professional relationships which remained intact after the war. In Switzerland I made contact with a group of French officers who were helping to build the intelligence service of De Gaulle and the Free French. Near the end of the war, co-operation was established with a branch of the Italian Secret Service that declared allegiance to King Victor Emmanuel when non-Fascist Italy joined the Allied cause. Through much of the war, I was also working secretly with the anti-Nazi group in the German *Abwehr*, the professional intelligence service of the German army. This group was involved in secret plots against Hitler. The head of the *Abwehr*, the extraordinary Admiral Canaris, was executed by Hitler after records were discovered proving that Canaris had co-operated with those who made the unsuccessful attempt on Hitler's life on July 20, 1944.

Legacy of World War II

This wartime co-operation with the intelligence services of the Free World has contributed, I believe, toward creating a certain unity of purpose among them today. NATO, SEATO, and other security communities are examples of present-day co-operation, needed to help the Free World counter the subversive activities and Cold War tactics of the intelligence and security services of the Soviet Union.

Essential to any discussion of the history of intelligence is a consideration of the Soviet service, which is one of the most tightly structured organizations of its kind in the world. It has just celebrated its 45th anniversary with what, for the Soviets, was a good deal of fanfare, considering their usual reticence on this subject. On December 20, 1962, an article appeared in *Pravda* written by the present Chief of Soviet State Security (K.G.B.), V. Semichastnyi, which opened with the words, "Forty-five years ago today, at the initiative of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin . . ." and went on to describe the founding of the first Soviet security body, the Cheka, in 1917, and to summarize the ups and downs of 45 years of Soviet police history. While the purpose of the article was no doubt to improve the public image of this justly feared and hated institution, its importance to the foreign observer lay in the tacit admission that despite changes of name and of leadership, the Soviets really view this organization as having a definite and unbroken continuity since the day of its founding.

Dual Totalitarian Services

Most totalitarian countries have, in the course of time, developed not just one but two intelligence services with quite distinct functions, even though the work of these services may occasionally overlap. One of these organizations is a military intelligence service run by the general staff and responsible for collecting military and technical information abroad. In the U.S.S.R. this military organization is called the G.R.U. (Intelligence Directorate). G.R.U. officers working out of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa operated the atomic spy networks in Canada during World War II. The other service, which more typically represents an exclusive development of a totalitarian state, is the "security" service. Generally such a service has its origin in a secret police force devoted to internal affairs such as the repression of dissidents and the protection of the regime. Gradually this organization expands outward, thrusting into neighbouring areas

which are not fully covered out over the globe as a full-fledged foreign intelligence service and much more.

Since this security service is primarily the creation of the clique or party in power, it will always be more trusted by political leaders than is the military intelligence service, and it will usually seek to dominate and control the military service, if not to absorb it. In Nazi Germany the "Reich Security Office," under Himmler, during 1944 completely took over its military counterpart, the *Abwehr*. In 1947, the security and military services in Soviet Russia were combined—with the former dominant—but the merger lasted only a year. In 1958, however, Khrushchev placed one of his most trusted security chiefs, General Ivan Serov, in charge of the G.R.U., apparently in order to keep an eye on it.

But whether or not the security service of a totalitarian state succeeds in gaining control of the military service, it inevitably becomes the more powerful organization. Furthermore, its functions, both internal and external, far exceed those of the intelligence services of free societies. Today, the Soviet State Security Service (K.G.B.) is the eyes and ears of the Soviet state abroad as well as at home. It is a multipurpose, clandestine arm of power that can in the last analysis carry out almost any act that the Soviet leadership assigns to it. It is more than a secret police organization, more than an intelligence and counterintelligence organization. It is an instrument for subversion, manipulation and violence, for secret intervention in the affairs of other countries. It is an aggressive arm of Soviet ambitions in the Cold War. If the Soviets send astronauts to the moon, I expect that a K.G.B. officer will accompany them.

Tsarist Secret Police

Secret police were not invented by the Soviets, and even the foreign operations of the K.G.B. have precedents in Russian history. The purpose of the tsars' Okhrana was to "protect" the Imperial family and its regime. In this capacity it kept watch on the Russian populace by means of armies of informants, and once even distinguished itself by tailing the venerable Leo Tolstoy around Russia. Tolstoy had long since become a world-renowned literary figure, but to the Okhrana he was only a retired army lieutenant and a "suspect."

In the late nineteenth century there were so many Russian revolutionaries, radical students and *émigrés* outside Russia that the Okhrana could not hope to keep Imperial Russia secure merely by suppressing the voices of revolution at home. It had to cope with dangerous voices from abroad. It sent agents to join, penetrate and provoke the organizations of Russian students and revolutionaries in western Europe, to incite, demoralize, steal documents, and discover the channels by which illegal literature was being smuggled into Russia. When Lenin was in Prague in 1912, he unknowingly harboured an Okhrana agent in his household. The primary reason for secret police operations abroad is to neutralize the political opposition of its own nationals in exile; although the Okhrana generally limited itself to this mission, Soviet State Security has not.

No sooner had the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia than they established their own secret police. The Cheka was set up under Feliks Dzerzhinski in December 1917 as a security force with executive powers. The name stood for "Extraordinary Commissions against Counter-Revolution and Sabotage." The Cheka was a militant, terroristic police force that ruthlessly liquidated civilians on the basis of denunciations and suspicion of bourgeois origins. It followed the Red armies in their conflicts with the White Russian forces, and operated as a kind of counter-espionage organization in areas where sovietization had not yet been accomplished. In 1921 it established a foreign arm, because by that time White Russian soldiers and civilian opponents of the

Bolsheviks who could manage to do so had fled to western Europe and the Middle and Far East and were seeking to strike back against the Bolsheviks from abroad.

Almost at once this foreign arm of Soviet security had a much bigger job than ever confronted the tsar's Okhrana. It had not only to penetrate and neutralize the Russian exile organizations that were conspiring against the Soviets, but also to discover and guard against the hostile acts of those Western powers anxious to see the downfall of the Bolsheviks. It thus became a political intelligence service with a militant mission. In order to achieve its aims, it engaged in violence and brutality, in kidnapping and murder, both at home and abroad. This activity was directed not only against the "enemies of the state" but against fellow Bolsheviks who were considered untrustworthy or burdensome. In Paris in 1926 the Soviet security murdered General Petliura, the exiled leader of the Ukrainian nationalists. In 1930, again in Paris, it kidnapped General Kutepov, the leader of the White Russian war veterans; in 1937, the same fate befell his successor, General Miller. For over a decade Leon Trotsky, who had gone into exile in 1929, was the prime assassination target of Stalin. On August 21, 1940, the old revolutionist died in Mexico City after being slashed with an Alpine climber's ice ax by an agent of Soviet security.

Lest anyone think that these violent acts against exiles who opposed or broke with the Bolsheviks in the early days were merely manifestations of the rough-and-tumble era of early Soviet history or of Stalin's personal vengefulness, it should be pointed out that in the subsequent era of so-called "socialist legality," which was proclaimed by Khrushchev in 1956, a later generation of exiled leaders was wiped out. The only difference between the earlier and later crops of political murders lay in the subtlety and efficacy of the murder weapons. The mysterious deaths in Munich, in 1957 and 1959, of Lev Rebet and Stephen Bandera, leaders of the Ukrainian *émigrés*, were managed with a cyanide spray that killed almost instantaneously. This method was so effective that, in Rebet's case, it was long thought that he had died of a heart attack. The truth became known only when the K.G.B. agent Bogdan Stashinskiy gave himself up to the German police in 1961 and acknowledged that

he had perpetrated both the killings.

In 1922, the Cheka became the G.P.U. (State Political Administration), which in 1934 became part of the N.K.V.D. (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs). This was a consolidation which finally brought together under one ministry all police, security and intelligence bodies—secret, overt, domestic and foreign. As the foreign arm of Soviet security was expanding into a world-wide espionage and political action organization, the domestic arm grew into a monster. It is said that under Stalin one out of every five Soviet citizens was reporting to it. In addition, it exercised control over the entire border militia, had an internal militia of its own, ran all the prisons and labour camps, and had become the watchdog over the government and over the Communist party itself. Its most frightening power as an internal secret police lay in its authority to arrest, condemn and liquidate at the behest of the dictator, his henchmen or even on its own cognizance, without any recourse to legal judgment or control by any other organ of government.

During the war years and afterward the colossus of the N.K.V.D. was split up, reconsolidated, split up again, reconsolidated again, and finally split up once more into two separate organizations. The M.G.B., now K.G.B., was made responsible for external espionage and high-level internal security; the other retained all policing functions not directly concerned with state security at the higher levels and was called the M.V.D. (Ministry of Internal Affairs).

Obviously, any clandestine arm that can so permeate and control public life—even in the upper echelons of power—must be kept under the absolute control of the dictator. Thus, it must occasionally be purged and weakened to keep it from swallowing up everything, the dictator included. The history of Soviet state security, under its various names, exhibits many cycles of growing strength and subsequent purge, of consolidation and of splintering, of rashes of political murders carried out by it and similar rashes against it. After the demise of any leader who had exploited it to keep himself in power, the service had to be cut back to size. Stalin used the G.P.U. to enforce collectivization and liquidate the kulaks during the early thirties, and the N.K.V.D. during the mid-thirties to wipe out all the people he



Wide World

Body of Joseph Stalin lying in state in Moscow in March 1953. Stalin, now repudiated by the Soviet government, was honoured by a line of mourners that stretched for ten miles, 16 abreast

did not trust or like in the party, the army and the government. Then in 1937 he purged the instrument of liquidation itself. Its chiefs and leading officers knew too much about his crimes, and their power was second only to his. By 1953, after the death of Stalin, the security service was again strong enough to become a dominant force in the struggle for power, and the so-called "collective leadership" felt they would not be safe until they had liquidated its leader, Lavrenti Beria, and cleaned out his henchmen.

In Khrushchev's now-famous address to the 20th congress of the Communist party in 1956, in which he exposed the crimes of Stalin, the main emphasis was on those crimes Stalin had committed through the N.K.V.D. This speech not only served to open Khrushchev's attack on Stalinism and the Stalinists still in the regime, but was also intended to justify new purges of existing state security organs, which he had to bring under his control in order to strengthen his own position as dictator. Anxious to give both the Soviet public and the outside world the impression that the new era of "socialist legality" was dawning, Khrushchev subsequently took various steps to wipe out the image of the security service as a repressive executive body. Once again, a change of name was in order. Khrushchev announced on September 3, 1962, that the Ministry of Internal Affairs (M.V.D.) was now to be called the Ministry of Public Law and Order. Just what this new ministry would do he did not clarify, although he did promise that no more trials would be held in which Soviet citizens were condemned in secret.

New Soviet Controls

But internal control systems still exist, even though in new forms. For example, under the terms of a decree published on November 28, 1962, an elaborate control system has been established which, to quote the *New York Times* (November 29, 1962), "would make every worker in every job a watchman over the implementation of party and government directives." In commenting on the decree *Pravda* made reference to earlier poor controls over "faking, pilfering, bribing and bureaucracy" and asserted that the new system would be a "sharp weapon" against them, as well as against "red tape and misuse of authority" and "squanderers of the national wealth." The new watchdog agency is called the Committee of Party and State Control.

With so many informers operating against such broad categories of crimes and misdemeanors, it should be possible to put almost anyone in jail at any time. And indeed the press has been full of reports recently that courts in the Soviet Union have been handing down death or long prison sentences for many offenses that in the United States would be only minor crimes or misdemeanors. It should also be noted that Aleksandr N. Shelepin, who was designated by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to be the head of this new control agency, once served as head of the K.G.B., having succeeded General Ivan Serov in 1958.

But all these shake-ups, purges and organizational changes seem to have had remarkably little effect on the aims, methods and capabilities of that part of the Soviet security service which interests us most—its foreign arm. Throughout its 45 years it has accumulated an enormous fund of knowledge and experience: techniques that have been amply tested as to their suitability in furthering its aims in various parts of the world, and files of intelligence information kept intact through all the political power struggles. It has in its ranks intelligence officers (those who survived the purges) of 20 to 30 years' experience. It has on its rosters disciplined, experienced agents and informants spread throughout the world, many of whom have been active since the 1930s. And it has a tradition that goes all the way back to tsarist days.

In their attempt to control the world, the Russian revolutionaries of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries developed the conspiratorial techniques that later stood the Soviets in such good stead. The complicated and devious tricks of concealing and passing messages, of falsifying documents, of using harmless intermediaries between suspect parties so as not to expose one to the other or allow both to be seen together—these were all survival techniques developed after bitter encounters with and many losses at the hands of the tsar's police. When the Soviets later founded their own secret police, these were the tricks they taught their agents to enable them to evade the police of other countries. Even the very words used by the Bolsheviks in their illegal days before 1917 as a kind of private slang became, with time, the terms in official use within the Soviet intelligence service.

A brief look at the end product of this tradition, the Soviet intelligence officer, should provide a fitting close to a history of intelligence work. To many he represents the culmination of centuries of the development of the breed. To my mind he represents the species *Homo Sovieticus* in its unalloyed and most successful form—this strikes me as much the most important thing about him, more important than his characteristics as a practitioner of the intelligence craft. It is as if he were the human end product of the Soviet system, the Soviet mentality refined to the *n*th degree.

He is blindly and unquestioningly dedicated to the cause, at least at the outset. He has been fully indoctrinated in the political and philosophical beliefs of communism and in the basic "morality" which proceeds from those beliefs. This morality holds that the ends alone count, and that any means that achieve them are justified. Since the ingrained Soviet approach to the problems of life and politics is entirely conspiratorial, it is no surprise that this approach finds its ultimate fulfillment in intelligence work.

Soviet Operative Ranks High

The Soviet intelligence officer throughout his career is subject to a rigid discipline. As one man put it, he "has graduated from an iron school." On the one hand, he belongs to an elite; he has privilege and power of a very special kind. He may ostensibly be an embassy chauffeur, but in truth his rank may be higher than that of the ambassador and he may possess more of the kind of power that really counts. At the same time, neither rank nor seniority nor past achievement will protect him if he makes a mistake. When a Soviet intelligence officer is detected or his agents are caught through an oversight on his part, he can expect demotion or dismissal, even prison.

It is no surprise, then, that the Soviet intelligence officer himself acquires a harsh, merciless attitude. There is no better example of this than the story told about one of Stalin's intelligence chiefs, General V. S. Abakumov. During the war, Abakumov's sister was picked up somewhere in Russia on a minor black-marketing charge, or "speculation." In view of her close connection to a man as powerful as Abakumov, the police officials making the arrest sent a message to him asking how he would like the case handled. They fully expected that he would request the charges be dropped. Instead, he is reliably reported to have written on the memorandum that had been sent him: "Why do you ask me? Don't you know your duty? Speculation during wartime is treason. Shoot her."

Abakumov met the fate of many Soviet intelligence officers after the death of Stalin and the liquidation of Beria. By that time he was in charge of the internal section of Soviet security and controlled the files on members of the government and of the party. Abakumov was secretly executed and his entire section was decimated under the Malenkov regime. They knew too much.

Despite certain weaknesses in the Soviet intelligence service, the "terror" still holds sway within Soviet intelligence itself; this arm of Soviet power cannot relax, cannot be allowed any weakness.

The Soviet citizen usually does not apply for a job in the intelligence service. He is spotted and chosen. Bright young men in various positions, be it in foreign affairs, economics or the sciences, are proposed for intelligence work by their superiors in the party. To pass muster they must themselves be either party members, candidates for party membership, or members of the Komsomol, the Communist youth organization for the older age groups. They must come from what appears to be an impeccable political background, which means that there can be no "bourgeois taint" to them or any record of deviation or dissent among their immediate family or forebears.

An ambitious young man who is able to make his career in one of the branches of intelligence service is fortunate by Soviet standards. His selection for this duty raises him to the ranks of the "New Class," the nobility of the new Russia. His prestige equals and often surpasses that of the military officer. He receives material rewards much above those given the similar ranks of government bureaucracy in other departments. He has opportunities for travel open to few Soviet citizens. Further, a career of this kind can lead to high political office and important rank in the Communist party.

But the Soviet security service suffers from the same fundamental weakness as does Soviet bureaucracy and Communist society generally—indifference to the individual and his feelings. This indifference results in frequent lack of recognition for personal service, improper assignments, frustrated ambition and unfair punishment—all of which breed in a Soviet, as in any man, loss of initiative, passivity, disgruntlement, and even disillusionment. Furthermore, service in the Soviet bureaucracy does not foster independent thought and the qualities of leadership. The average Soviet official, in the intelligence service as elsewhere, balks at assuming responsibility or risking his career. There is an ingrained tendency to perform tasks "by the book," to conform, to pass the bureaucratic buck if things go wrong.

Most important, every time the Soviets send an intelligence officer abroad they risk his exposure to the very systems he is dedicated to destroy. If for any reason he has become disillusioned or dissatisfied, his contact with the Western world often works as the catalyst that starts the process of disaffection. A steadily growing number of Soviet intelligence officers have been coming over to our side, proving that Soviet intelligence is by no means as monolithic and invulnerable as it wishes the world to believe.

IV. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

The collection of foreign intelligence is accomplished in a variety of ways, not all of them mysterious or even difficult to understand. This is particularly true of overt intelligence which is information derived from newspapers, books, learned and technical publications, official reports of government proceedings, radio and television. Even a novel or a play may contain useful information about the state of a nation.

Two important sources of overt intelligence in the Soviet Union are, of course, the newspapers *Izvestia* and *Pravda*, which translate into "News" and "Truth." The former is an organ of the government and the latter of the party. There are also "little" *Izvestias* and *Pravdas* throughout Russia. A wit once suggested that in *Izvestia* there is no news and in *Pravda* there is no truth. This is a fairly accurate statement, but it is, nevertheless, of real interest to know what they publish and what they ignore, and what turn they give to embarrassing developments that they are

It is, for example, illuminating to compare the published text of Khrushchev's extemporaneous remarks in Soviet media with what he actually said. His now-famous remark to Western diplomats at a Polish Embassy reception in Moscow on November 18, 1956, "We will bury you," was not quoted thusly in the Soviet press reports, even though it was overheard by many. The state press apparently has the right to censor Premier Khrushchev, presumably with his approval. Later, of course, the remark caught up with Khrushchev and he gave a lengthy and somewhat mollifying interpretation of it. How and why a story is twisted is thus at least as interesting as the actual content. Often there is one version for domestic consumption, another for the other Communist bloc countries and still other versions for different foreign countries. There are times when the "fairy stories" that Communist regimes tell their own people are indicative of new vulnerabilities and new fears.

The collection of overt foreign information by the United States is largely the business of the State Department, with other government departments co-operating in accordance with their own needs. The CIA has an interest in the "product" and shares in collection, selection and translation. Obviously, to collect such intelligence on a world-wide basis is a colossal job, but the work is well organized and the burden equitably shared. The monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts that might be of interest to us is one of the biggest parts of the job. In the Iron Curtain countries alone, millions of words are spewed out over the air every day; most of the broadcasts originate in Moscow and Peking, some directed to domestic audiences and others beamed abroad.

Trained Analysts Needed

All overt information is grist for the intelligence mill. It is there for the getting, but large numbers of trained personnel are required to sort and cull it in order to find the grain of wheat in the mountains of chaff. For example, in the fall of 1961 we were forewarned by a few hours of the Soviet intention to resume atomic testing, by means of a vague news item transmitted by Radio Moscow for publication in a provincial Soviet journal. A young lady at a remote listening post spotted this item, analyzed it correctly, and relayed it to Washington immediately. Vigilance and perceptiveness succeeded in singling out one significant piece of intelligence from the mountains of deadly verbiage that have to be listened to daily.

In countries that are free, where the press is free and the publication of political and scientific information is not hampered by the government, the collection of overt intelligence is of particular value and is of direct use in the preparation of our intelligence estimates. Since we are that kind of a country ourselves, we are victims of this kind of collection. The Soviets pick up some of their most valuable information about us from our publications, particularly from our technical and scientific journals, published transcripts of congressional hearings and the like. A recent defector from the Polish diplomatic mission in Washington has told us that his embassy is assigned the task of collecting this literature for Moscow's use. There is no problem in acquiring it. The Soviets simply want to spare themselves the effort in order to be able to devote their time to more demanding tasks; also, they feel that a Polish collection agent is likely to have less trouble than a Russian in picking up the required material.

Information is also collected in the ordinary course of conducting official relations with a foreign power. This is not overt in the sense that it is available to anyone who reads the papers or listens to the radio. Indeed, the success of diplomatic negotiations calls for a certain measure of secrecy. But information

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derived from diplomatic meetings. The intelligence service for the preparation of estimates. Such information may contain facts, slants and hints that are significant, especially when coupled with intelligence from other sources. If the Foreign Minister of X hesitates to accept a United States offer on Monday, it may be that he is seeing the Soviets on Tuesday. Later, from an entirely different quarter, we may get a glimpse into the Soviet offer. Together these two items will probably have much more meaning than either would have had alone.

Our effort in overt collection is broad and massive. It tries to miss nothing that is readily available and might be of use. Yet there may be some subjects on which the government urgently needs information that are not covered by such material. Or, this material may lack sufficient detail, may be inconclusive, or may not be completely reliable. Naturally, this is more often the case in a closed society. We cannot depend on the Soviets making public, either intentionally or inadvertently, what our government wants to know; only what they wish us to believe. When they do give out official information, it cannot always be trusted. Published statistics may credit a five-year plan with great success; economic intelligence from inside informants shows that the plan failed in certain respects and that the ruble statistics given were not a true index of values. Photographs may be doctored, or even faked, as was the famous Soviet publicity picture of the junk heap designated as the downed U-2. The rocket in the Red Army Day parade, witnessed and photographed by Western newsmen and military attachés, may be a dud, an assemblage of odd rocket parts that do not really constitute a working missile. As easy as it is to collect overt intelligence, it is equally easy to plant deception within it. For all these reasons, clandestine intelligence collection (espionage) must remain an essential and basic activity of intelligence.

Clandestine intelligence collection is chiefly a matter of circumventing obstacles in order to reach an objective. Our side chooses the objective. The opponent has set up the obstacles. Usually he knows which objectives are most important to us, and he surrounds these with appropriately difficult obstacles. For example, when the Soviets started testing their missiles, they chose launching sites in their most remote and inapproachable waste-

lands. The more closed and rigid the control a government has over its people, the more obstacles there are. In our time this means that U.S. intelligence must delve for the intentions and capabilities of a nation pledged to secrecy and organized for deception, whose key installations may be buried a thousand miles off the beaten track.

In this particular situation our government determines what the objectives are and what information it needs, without regard to the obstacles. It also establishes priorities among these objectives according to their relative urgency. ICBMs will take priority over steel production. Whether or not the Soviet Union would go to war over Laos will take priority over the political shading of a new regime in the Middle East. Only after priority has been established is the question of obstacles examined. If the information can be obtained by overt collection or in the ordinary course of diplomatic work, the intelligence service will not be asked to devote to the task its limited assets for clandestine collection. But if it is decided that secret intelligence must do the job, then it is usually because serious obstacles are known to surround the target.

Free and Denied Areas

In the eyes of Western intelligence, the world is divided into two kinds of places—"free areas" and "denied areas." Its major targets lie in the denied areas, that is, behind the Iron and Bamboo curtains, and are comprised of the military, technical and industrial installations—the capabilities—that constitute the backbone of Sino-Soviet power. Also among the major targets are the plans of the people who guide the Soviet Union and Communist China—their intentions concerning warfare and their "peaceful" political intentions. All information about such targets is called "positive intelligence."

The Berlin Wall not only shut off the two halves of a politically divided city from each other and severely limited the number of East Germans escaping to the West. It also was supposed to plug one of the last big gaps in the Iron Curtain, the barrier of barbed wire, land mines, observation towers, mobile patrols and "sanitized" border areas that zigzags southward from the Baltic. The erection of the Berlin Wall is intended to be the final



United Press International
Official Soviet photograph of what was represented as the wreckage of the U-2 plane piloted by Francis Gary Powers, shot down over Soviet territory in May 1960. It was a pile of junk assembled for propaganda rather than the actual plane. The real wreckage was later put on display

step in sealing off eastern Europe, a process that took 16 years to accomplish. Yet it is still possible to get under or over, around or even through the barrier of the Iron Curtain. It is just the first of a series of obstacles. Behind that first wall are segregated and restricted areas and, behind these, the walls of institutional and personal secrecy. This combination protects everything the Soviet state believes could reveal either its strengths or weaknesses to the inquisitive West.

Clandestine collection uses people: "agents," "sources," "informants." It may also use machines, for there are machines today that can do things human beings cannot do and can "see" things they cannot see. Since the opponent would try to stop this effort if he could locate and reach it, it is carried out in secret; thus we speak of it as clandestine collection. The traditional word for it is espionage.

The essence of espionage is access. Someone, or some device, has to get close enough to a thing, a place or a person to observe or discover the desired facts without arousing the attention of those who protect them. The information must then be delivered to the people who want it. It must move quickly or it may get "stale." And it must not get lost or be intercepted en route.


At its simplest, espionage is nothing more than a kind of well-concealed reconnaissance. This suffices when a brief look at the target is all that is needed. The agent makes his way to an objective, observes it, then comes back and reports what he saw. The target is usually fairly large and easily discernible—such things as troop dispositions, fortifications or airfields. Perhaps the agent also can make his way into a closed installation and have a look around, or even make off with documents. In any case, the length of his stay is limited. Continuous reportage is impossible to maintain because the agent's presence in the area is secret and illegal.

Technical Know-How Required

Behind the Iron Curtain today, this method of spying is hardly adequate, not because the obstacles are so formidable that they cannot be breached but because the kind of man who is equipped by his training to breach them is not likely to have the technical knowledge that will enable him to make a useful report on the complex targets that exist nowadays. If you don't know anything about nuclear reactors there is little you can discover about one, even when you are standing right next to it. And even for the rare person who might be competent in both fields, just getting close to such a target is hardly enough to fulfill today's intelligence requirements. What is needed is a thorough examination of the actual workings of the reactor. For this reason it is unrealistic to think that U.S. or other Western tourists in the Soviet Union can be of much use in intelligence collection. But for propaganda reasons, the Soviets continue to arrest tourists now and then in order to give the world the impression that U.S. espionage is a vast effort exploiting even the innocent traveler.

Of far more long-term value than reconnaissance is "penetration" by an agent, meaning that he somehow is able to get inside the target and stay there. One of the ways of going about this is for the agent to insinuate himself into the offices or the elite circles of another power by means of subterfuge. He is then in a position to elicit the desired information from persons who come to trust him and who are entirely unaware of his true role. In popular parlance, this operation is called a "plant."

The plant is a tried and true method of espionage. In our own history we have the example, in Revolutionary War days, of the adroit British spy, Dr. Edward Bancroft, who was born in the Colonies and who successfully wormed his way into the employ and confidence of Benjamin Franklin. In 1776 Franklin was negotiating in Paris for French aid for the Colonies. Professing



Culver Pictures, Inc.

Benjamin Franklin dictating to Edward Bancroft, the trusted secretary-assistant who was an espionage agent for Britain during the Revolution

loyalty to the American cause, Bancroft worked as Franklin's secretary and assistant for little pay. His real mission was to report to George III's government on Franklin's progress with the French. He passed his messages to the British Embassy in Paris by depositing them in a bottle hidden in the hollow root of a tree in the Tuileries Gardens. Whenever he had more information than could be fitted into the bottle, or when he needed new directives from the British, he simply paid a visit to London—with Franklin's blessing—for he persuaded Franklin that he could pick up valuable information for the Americans in London. The British obligingly supplied him with what we today call "chicken feed," misleading information prepared for the opponents' consumption.

To deflect possible suspicion of their agent, the British once even arrested Bancroft as he was leaving England, an action intended to impress Franklin with his *bona fides* and with the dangers to which his devotion to the American cause exposed him. Everything depended, of course, on the acting ability of Dr. Bancroft, which was so effective that when Franklin was later presented with evidence of Bancroft's duplicity he refused to believe it. Even as wise and able a diplomat as Franklin could be fooled by a spy whose credentials rested on his own claims.

A penetration of this kind is predicated upon a show of outer loyalties, which are often not put to the test. Nor are they easily tested, especially when opponents share a common language and background. Today, when the lines that separate one nation from another are so sharply drawn with respect to basic outlook and frame of reference, the dissembling of loyalties is more difficult to maintain over a long period of time and under close scrutiny. It can be managed, though. One of the most notorious Soviet espionage operations before and during World War II was the Sorge network in the Far East. The agents of Richard Sorge, a German Communist, provided the Soviets with top-level information on Japan's military planning. Although the network was primarily directed against Japanese targets, Sorge himself made it his business to cultivate his fellow countrymen at the German Embassy in Tokyo. Eventually he succeeded in

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having himself assigned to the press section of the Embassy. This not only gave him excellent cover but also provided him with inside information about the Nazis' conduct of the war and their relations with Japan.

To achieve this, Sorge had to play the part of the good Nazi, which he apparently did convincingly. The Gestapo chief in the embassy, as well as the ambassador and the service attachés, were all his friends. Had the Gestapo in Berlin ever investigated Sorge's past, as it eventually did after Sorge was apprehended by the Japanese in 1942, it would have discovered that Sorge had been a Communist agent and agitator in Germany during the early 1920s.

Soviet Espionage in the West

Shortly thereafter, we were being subjected to similar treatment at the hands of Soviet espionage. Names such as Bruno Pontecorvo and Klaus Fuchs come to mind as agents who were unmasked after the war. In some such cases records of previous Communist affiliations lay in the files of Western security and intelligence services, even while the agents held responsible positions in the West, but they were ignored until it was too late. Because physicists like Fuchs and Pontecorvo moved from job to job among the allied countries—one year in Great Britain, another in Canada and another in the United States—and because the scientific laboratories of the Allies were working under great pressures, investigations of personnel with credentials from Allied countries were not always conducted as thoroughly as in the case of U.S. citizens. And when available records were consulted, the data found in them—particularly if

Richard Sorge, German newspaperman who was acting as press advisor in Tokyo while running a spy ring for Soviet Russia in Japan in the early 1940s

Wide World



Camera Press—Pix from Publix

Italian atomic scientist Bruno Pontecorvo, who left his top-secret post at Britain's Harwell Research establishment in 1950 and flew to the U.S.S.R. This photograph was taken at one of his rare public appearances in Moscow

of Nazi origin—seem often to have been discounted at a time when Russia was our ally and Hitler our enemy, and when the war effort required the technical services of gifted scientists.

The consequences of these omissions and oversights during the turbulent war years are regrettable, and the lesson will not easily be forgotten. We cannot afford any more Fuchses or Pontecorvos. Today, investigation of persons seeking employment in sensitive areas of the U.S. government and related technical installations is justifiably thorough and painstaking.

An agent who performs as a plant in our time must have more in his favour than acting ability; he can succeed only if there is no record of his ever having been something other than what he represents himself to be. The only way to disguise a man today so that he will be acceptable in hostile circles for any length of time is to make him over entirely. This involves years of training and a thorough concealing and burying of the past under layers of fictitious personal history which have to be "backstopped." An agent made over in this fashion is referred to as an "illegal."

If you were really born in Finland, but are supposed to have been born in Munich, Germany, then you must have documents showing your connection to that city. You have to be able to act like someone who was born and lived there. Arrangements have to be made in Munich in order to confirm your origin there in case you are ever investigated. In most Western countries the lax procedures involved in issuing duplicates of most vital statistics—birth certificates, records of marriage, death, etc.—make it relatively easy for hostile intelligence services to procure valid documents for "papering" their agents. The Soviets have frequently taken advantage of this fact, and it would certainly be in our interest to tighten up this laxity.



Wide World

Klaus Fuchs, scientist member of the ring that fed atomic secrets to Soviet Russia, arriving at an East German airport after his release from a British prison

The Soviet "illegal" may be a Soviet national or a native of almost any country in the world. His actual origin is of no great importance, since it is completely buried under a new nationality and a new identity. A national chosen for such work will be sent to live abroad for as many years as it takes him to perfect his knowledge of the language and way of life of the other country. He may even acquire citizenship in the adopted country. But during this whole period he has absolutely no intelligence mission. He does nothing that would arouse suspicion. When he has become sufficiently acclimatized, he returns to the Soviet Union where he is trained and documented for his intelligence mission, tested for his loyalties and eventually dispatched to the target country, which may be the same one he has learned to live in, or a different one. It matters little, for the main thing is that he is unrecognizable as a Soviet or eastern European. He is a German or a Scandinavian or a South American. His papers show it, and so do his speech and his manners.

The Case of Gordon Lonsdale

Gordon Lonsdale, the "Canadian" who was caught in London in early 1961 as the leading figure in an extensive Soviet spy ring, was a Russian whose Canadian identity had been carefully built up over many years. Here the Soviets used their "illegal" not to work in Canada, where he would have been much more exposed to accidental encounters with people from his "home town," but in England, where, as a Canadian, he would be quite acceptable and would be unlikely to become the subject of much curiosity about the details of his background.

Because they have almost perfect camouflage and are consequently immensely difficult to locate, "illegals" constitute the gravest security hazards to countries against which they are working. There is every evidence that the Soviets have been turning out such "illegals" at an accelerated rate since the end of

World War II. Generally, they have a very high advisory capacity, for directing espionage networks, rather than for penetration jobs that increase the danger of discovery. Lonsdale was such a man, and so was Rudolf Abel, who masqueraded in Brooklyn as a photographer and who, after his conviction as a spy, was exchanged for the downed U-2 pilot, Francis Gary Powers, in 1962.

An alternative procedure to attempting to place one's own agent within a highly sensitive foreign target is to find somebody who is already there and recruit him. This technique must be adapted to suit each case. The main thing is to find an insider who is willing to co-operate and who also is "cleared" and qualified in his position. Often, however, such a person is not quite at the right spot to have access to the information you need. Or you might have to settle for someone just beginning a career that will eventually lead to his employment in the area of the target. Some maneuvering and manipulation is needed to get your man, who is more or less an amateur in espionage, in the place where he can acquire the information without arousing suspicion.

Most of the notorious instances of Soviet penetration of important targets in Western countries were made possible by the recruitment of someone already employed inside the target. David Greenglass, although only a draftsman at Los Alamos during World War II, had access to secret details of the internal construction of the atomic bomb. Judith Coplon, while employed in a section of the Department of Justice responsible for the registration of foreign agents in the United States, regularly copied FBI reports crossing her desk concerning investigations of espionage in the United States. Joseph Scarbeck was only an administrative officer in our embassy in Warsaw, but after he had been trapped by a female Polish agent and blackmailed, he managed to procure for the Polish intelligence service (operating under Soviet direction) some of our ambassador's secret reports

Lieut. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, former Director of the CIA
United Press International



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Wide World

David Greenglass, former U.S. army technician who was convicted as a member of the Rosenberg atomic spy ring, in custody of a U.S. deputy marshal after his arraignment in June 1950

to the State Department on the political situation in eastern Europe. In Great Britain, Henry Houghton and John Vassall, although of low rank and engaged chiefly in administrative work, were able to procure classified technical information from the Admiralty. Alfred Frenzel, a West German parliamentarian, had access to NATO documents distributed to a West German parliamentary defense committee on which he served. Heinz Felfe, in the West German intelligence service, whose case is still pending in the German courts, had plenty of opportunity to pass valuable information to the Soviets during the years he was progressing up the ladder as a promising young intelligence expert.

The "Insider" Is Useful

All of these people, at the time they were recruited, were already employed in some job that made them interesting to the Communists because of their positions of natural access. In some cases, they later moved up into jobs that increased their value to the Soviets, and these transfers may in some instances have been achieved under secret guidance from the Soviets. Houghton and Vassall were both recruited while stationed at British embassies behind the Iron Curtain. When each returned home and was assigned to a position in the Admiralty, his access to important documents and other information naturally was broadened. Similarly, had Scarbeck not been caught as a result of careful counterintelligence efforts while still at his post in Warsaw, he probably would have been of ever-increasing use to the Soviets as he was reassigned to one United States diplomatic post after another over the years.

In this kind of espionage operation, then, the first step is the most crucial. Everything depends upon the ability to "spot" the

right person—the one who is vulnerable—inside the target, to reach him without being apprehended, to persuade him to cooperate, to continue to communicate with him secretly after he has been won over. This is where one can really begin to talk about the techniques of espionage. There are techniques for "spotting" agents, for recruiting agents, for directing agents, for testing agents, and for communicating with agents. If the operation is very sensitive, the Soviets will use one of their "illegals" to handle the case. The illegal, unless apprehended with the agent or betrayed by him, can disappear into the woodwork if something goes wrong. There will be no trail leading to a Soviet diplomatic installation to embarrass or discredit it. There are times, however, when Soviet intelligence personnel stationed in an embassy or some other official installation will handle recruited agents or certain aspects of their operations. Sometimes the "cover" of the embassy or trade mission lends advantages not available to the illegal, and if the so-called "legal resident" is caught in the act, all that happens is his enforced departure and the subsequent arrival of a replacement to fill his shoes.

If, for example, the Soviets are anxious to find an agent in a Western country who will provide intelligence on a certain sensitive industry, they will use the built-in spotting mechanism provided by their embassies or trade missions. With the object of looking over candidates without their knowing it or the local authorities knowing it, the Soviet trade mission will advertise that it is interested in purchasing certain nonstrategic items manufactured by the particular industry or one closely allied to it. Manufacturers will be attracted and will visit the Soviet mission to talk over possible business. But it is just a ruse to entice into the field of vision of Soviet intelligence, people with the desired access. The visitors will be requested to fill out forms calling for personal and business data, references, financial statements, and the like. All this material is reviewed by the intelligence officer stationed at the mission, who may also participate in the personal interviews and get a direct look at the human material under consideration. If any candidates seem promising because of their innocence, their political or perhaps apolitical attitudes, their need for money or susceptibility to blackmail, the Soviets can cultivate them further by pretending that the business deal is slowly brewing. The hand of espionage has not yet been shown. Ostensibly, nothing has yet been done against the law.

"Spotting of Agents"

The Communist party apparatus and Communist front organizations can also be used to spot potential agents for espionage. The evidence given in the Canadian trials shortly after World War II by the defected code clerk from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, Igor Gouzenko, acquainted the public for the first time with the elaborate techniques employed by the Communist party under various guises. "Reading groups" and "study groups" for persons quite innocently interested in Russia were formed within Canadian defense industries, entirely for the purpose of spotting and cultivating people who could eventually be exploited for the information they possessed. The target in this case was the atomic bomb.

However, the Communist party outside the Soviet Union has been used only intermittently by the Soviet government for actual espionage. Every time some element of the Communist party is caught in acts of espionage, this discredits the party as an "idealistic" and indigenous political organization and exposes it for what it really is—the instrument of a hostile foreign power, the stooge of Moscow. Whenever such exposures have taken place, as happened frequently in Europe in the 1920s, it has been observed that, for a time, there is a sharp decline in the intelligence work performed by local Communist parties. The value

of using personnel not fully trained in intelligence work is questionable, since these amateur collaborators can expose not only themselves but also the operations of the intelligence service proper.

Chiefly in countries where the party is tolerated but where resident agents are difficult to procure, the Soviet intelligence services have had recourse to the party. This was the case in the United States during World War II. One of the reasons for the eventual collapse of Soviet networks that reached deeply into our government at that time was the fact that the personnel were not ideally suited for espionage. Many of these people had only strong ideological leanings toward communism to recommend them for such work and in time were repelled by the discipline of espionage. Some, like Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley, to whom the work became unpalatable, finally balked and went and told their stories to the FBI. This problem came to a head for the Soviets just after the end of World War II as a result of the Gouzenko revelations. At that time the K.G.B. issued a secret order to its officers abroad not to involve members of Communist parties further in intelligence work.

In foreign and hostile countries, then, the Soviets must proceed with some caution in recruiting resident agents. They have not always done so, of course. Some of their attempts, particularly through their UN personnel, have been so crude and barefaced as to give the impression that the UN is being used by them for the schooling of their spies.

Entrapping Victims

But within the Soviet Union itself, or in a bloc country, where the Soviets can set the stage, provide the facilities—a safe house, hotel or nightclub—and furnish the cast of men or women *agents provocateurs*, more vigorous tactics are customarily used to recruit or entrap prospective agents. The Soviets often work on the principle that in order to get a man to do what you want, you try to catch him in something he would not like to have exposed

to the public, to his wife, to his employers or to his government. If the potential victim has done nothing on his own to compromise himself, then he or she must be enticed into a compromising situation set up by K.G.B. operatives. Two of the most recent cases involving this technique are those of Joseph Scarbeck in Poland and John Vassall in the Soviet Union.

The sordid story of Vassall, the British Admiralty employee who spied for the Soviets for six years both in the Soviet Union and in London, is a typical one. In my own experience, I have run across a score of cases where the scenarios are almost identical with this one. The K.G.B. operatives assigned to the task, after studying Vassall's case history from all angles and analyzing his weaknesses, set up the plan to frame him, exploiting the fact that he was a homosexual. The usual procedure here is to invite the victim to what appears to be a social affair; there the particular temptation to which the victim is likely to succumb is proffered him and his behaviour is recorded on tape or on film. He is then confronted with the evidence and told that unless he works for the Soviets the evidence will be brought to the attention of his employers. Vassall succumbed to this.

If the target individual is strong-willed enough to tell the whole story to his superior officer immediately, then the Soviet attempts at recruitment can be thwarted with relatively little danger to the individual concerned—even if he is residing in the Soviet Union. Sometimes his superior officer will want to play the man back against the Soviet apparatus in order to ferret out all the individuals and the tactics involved. But if the man approached does not seem qualified to play such a role, especially if the approach was made behind the Iron Curtain, he is merely told to break off from his tormentors and tell them he has disclosed everything.

There is, of course, the other side of the coin. Western intelligence is able to procure agents too, but does not use the same methods. It is no secret that the piercing of the Iron and Bamboo curtains is made easier for the West because of the volunteers



Camera Press—Pix from Public
Hungarian freedom fighters crossing
snow-covered fields to refuge in Austria
after Soviet Russia's suppression
of the uprising

who come our way. We don't always have to go to the target. Often it comes to us through people who are well acquainted with it. While this is not a one-way street, the West has gained far more in recent years from volunteers than its opponents have. The reason for this is the growing discontent with the system inside the Soviet Union, the satellite nations and Communist China. These volunteers are either refugees and defectors who cross over the frontiers to us or they are people who remain "in place" in order to serve us within the Communist societies.

Information from refugees is often piecemeal and scattered, but for years it has added to our basic fund of knowledge about European satellites of Soviet Russia. The upheaval of the Hungarian revolution in 1956 sent more than a quarter of a million refugees fleeing westward. Needless to say, they brought us up-to-date on every aspect of technical, scientific and military achievement in Hungary and gave us an excellent forecast of likely capabilities for years to come. Among the hundreds of thousands of refugees who have come over from East Germany, other satellites and Communist China since the end of World War II, many have performed a similar service.

"Defector"—a Misnomer

The term "defector" I consider to be an unfortunate one. It has become imbedded in the jargon of international relations and intelligence to describe the officials or highly knowledgeable citizens of the Communist bloc who leave their country and come to the West. And the West has had some defectors, too. It is, however, a term that is resented, and properly so, by the persons who come to freedom from tyranny. I do not claim that all so-called defectors have come to the West for ideological reasons. Some have come out of more mundane motives: in certain cases because they have failed in their jobs; in some because they are fearful that a shake-up in the regime will lead to their demotion or worse; some are lured by the physical attractions of the West, human or material. But a large number have come over for highly ideological reasons. They were revolted by life in the Communist world, by the tasks they were assigned by their superiors. They yearned for something better and more satisfying. The term "volunteer" is more suitable for these people, and I prefer to use it whenever possible.

If the one who comes over to us has been part of the Soviet hierarchy, he knows the strengths and weaknesses of the regime that employed him—its factions, its inefficiencies and its corruption. As a specialist, he knows its achievements in whatever was his chosen field—soldiers, science, education, diplomacy or intelligence. The reader of the daily papers in the West knows that among the defectors are soldiers, diplomats, scientists, engineers, ballet dancers, athletes and, not infrequently, intelligence officers.

Secret Agents of the West

The fact that behind the Iron Curtain there are many people who seriously consider taking this step is a matter of deep interest to the intelligence services of the West. Our task is to make them understand that they will be welcome and secure once they have come out. Experience has shown that many of them hesitate to take the final step, not because they have qualms about forsaking a detested way of life, but because they are afraid of the unknowns that await them. So an effort is made to show that they are welcome and will be safe and happy with us. Every time a newly arrived defector goes on the air over the Voice of America and says he is glad to be here and is being treated well, countless officials behind the Iron Curtain will take heart and go back to figuring out just how they can get themselves appointed as trade representatives in Oslo or Paris. Short-term visitors to the West from the Soviet bloc would probably defect in far greater num-

bers than is presently the case if it were not for the usual Soviet practice of keeping some of their own people behind as hostages.

On the other hand, the fate of those who have gone from our side over to the other would not serve as a particularly good advertisement for further such defections. Some of these people have recently talked to Western visitors and have admitted, without prompting, that their lot is miserable and that they have no future. The scientific defectors, like the atomic physicist Pontecorvo, who continue to be useful to the Soviet in their technological efforts, seem to fare better than the others. The Burgesses and MacLeans, the Martins and Mitchells have had their day of publicity and now eke out a dull living, sometimes as "propaganda advisors." Some of them still hope one day to be able to return to the West.

It is occasionally the case that defectors from the Communist side are not exactly what they seem. Rather, they have been working "in place" as agents for the West for long periods of time previous to their appearance as defectors, and have come to the West only because they or we feel that the dangers of remaining inside have become too great. In addition, some who come over from the Soviet bloc have never been "surfaced" and remain unknown to the public. The Soviets know, of course, that they have left, but not to what precise location. This concealment is desirable in some cases in order to protect the individuals involved.

People who volunteer "in place" have many ways of doing so, in spite of the isolation, the physical barriers and the internal controls of the Soviet bloc. There are relatively safe channels of communication with the West, including, surprisingly enough, the mails. As long as the address on a letter looks harmless and the identity of the sender (the agent "in place") remains concealed, there is little danger. Soviet bloc censorship cannot possibly inspect every piece of the great volume of mail passing to and fro over the borders. And even if a letter is intercepted, it need give no clue whatever to the sender if proper security precautions are followed. Various radio stations in western Europe broadcasting to the Soviet bloc can thus solicit comments and "fan mail" from listeners, and receive letters by the thousands from behind the Iron Curtain.

Science Vital to Intelligence

Anyone who knows how the latest filing and sorting machines are used in personnel work will not be surprised to hear that if the intelligence service is looking for a man who speaks Swahili and French, has a degree in chemical engineering, is unmarried, over 35 and under 5'8", all it has to do is push a button and in less than 40 seconds it will know whether a man with these qualifications is available, along with other information about him. The same kinds of machines are used in sorting out and assembling the data of intelligence itself.

But this is a small feat compared with how technology is used in the collection of information. Many targets of contemporary intelligence by their very nature suggest the creation of the technical devices by which they can be observed. If a target emits a telltale sound, then a sensitive acoustical device comes to mind for monitoring it. If the target causes shock waves in the earth, then seismographic apparatus will detect these. Moreover, the need to observe and measure the effects of our own technological experiments, e.g., with nuclear weapons and missiles, has hastened the refinement of equipment which, with some modifications, can also be useful for observing other people's experiments.

Radar and accurate long-range photography are the basic tools of technical collection. Another is the collection and analysis of air samples in the atmosphere in order to determine the presence of radioactivity. Since radioactive particles are carried by winds

over national borders in order to collect such samples. Beginning in 1948 our government instituted a program calling for round-the-clock monitoring of the atmosphere by aircraft for the purpose of detecting any experimentation with atomic weapons. After this program was installed, the first evidence of a Soviet atomic explosion on the Asiatic mainland was detected in September of 1949. Later refinements in instrumentation enable us to discover not only the fact that atomic explosions have taken place but also the power and type of the atomic device detonated.

Many targets, of course, do not betray their location and nature by any such activity as bomb detonation or a missile launching that can be traced from afar in the upper atmosphere. To observe such targets, one must get directly over them at very high altitudes, armed with long-range cameras. This requirement led to the development of the U-2. It was safer, more accurate and more dependable than anything that could be performed by an agent on the ground. Its feats could be equaled only by the acquisition of technical documents directly from Soviet offices and laboratories. The U-2 marked a new high, in more ways than one, in the scientific collection of intelligence. Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Secretary of Defense of the United States at the time of the U-2 incident, May 1, 1960, testified to this before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 2, 1960:

From these flights we got information on airfields, aircraft, missiles, missile testing and training, special weapons storage, submarine production, atomic production and aircraft deployment . . . all types of vital information. These results were considered in formulating our military programs. We obviously were the prime customer, and ours is the major interest.

In more recent days, it was the high-altitude U-2 reconnaissance flights which gave the "hard" evidence of the positioning

If they had not been discovered while work on the bases was still in progress and before they could be camouflaged, these bases might have constituted a secret and deadly threat to our security and that of this hemisphere. Here too was an interesting case in which classical collection methods wedded to scientific methods brought extremely valuable results. Various agents and refugees from Cuba reported that something in the nature of missile bases was being constructed and pinpointed the area of construction; this led to the gathering of proof by aerial reconnaissance.


Radar and the Battle of Britain


Scientific intelligence collection has proved its value a hundred times over. Winston Churchill in his history of World War II describes British development of radar and its use in the Battle of Britain, as well as British success in bending, amplifying and falsifying by scientific means the directional signals sent to guide the attacking German aircraft. He concludes that "unless British science had proved superior to German and unless its strange, sinister resources had been effectively brought to bear in the struggle for survival, we might well have been defeated, and being defeated, destroyed." Science as a vital arm of intelligence is here to stay. We are in a critical competitive race with the scientific development of the Communist bloc, particularly that of the Soviet Union, and we must see to it that we *remain* in a position of leadership. Some day this may be as vital to us as radar was to Britain in 1940.

A technical aid to espionage of another kind is the concealed microphone and transmitter, carrying live information in the form of conversations from inside a target to a nearby listening post. What the public knows as "tapping" telephones or as "bug-

San Diego, Calif., naval air station as seen from a plane flying at 70,000 ft. Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower used this photograph in a television report to the nation in 1960, following the collapse of the Paris summit conference, to illustrate the power of aerial surveillance at great heights

Wide World





Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. ambassador to the UN, demonstrating to the Security Council in May 1960 how a micro-telephone had been concealed within a wooden carving of the Great Seal of the U.S., that had been hung in the office of the U.S. ambassador in Moscow as a gift from the U.S.S.R.

ging" or "miking" offices is called "audio-surveillance" in intelligence work. Three things are required for this: excellent miniaturized electronic equipment, clever methods of concealment and a human agent to penetrate the premises and do the concealing.

The public usually hears of this activity only when it is practised by law-enforcement or security organizations in their own locality. But in June of 1960 Ambassador Lodge displayed before the United Nations in New York a plaque of the Great Seal of the United States which had been hanging in the office of the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow. He showed how the Soviets had concealed a tiny instrument in the seal which, when activated, permitted a Soviet listening post to overhear everything that was said in the ambassador's office. The installation of this device was no great feat for the Soviets, since every foreign embassy in Moscow has to call on the services of local electricians, telephone men, plumbers, charwomen and the like.

Performing the same trick outside one's own country is something else. Any intelligence service must consider the possible repercussions and embarrassments that may result from the discovery that an official installation has been illegally entered and its equipment tampered with. As in all espionage operations, the trick is to find the man who can do the job and who has the talent and the motive, whether patriotic or pecuniary. There was one instance when the Soviets managed to place microphones

in the flowerpots that decorated the offices of a Western embassy. The janitor of the building, who had a weakness for alcohol, was glad to comply for a little pocket money. He never knew who the people were who borrowed the pots from him every now and then or what they did with them.

There is hardly a technological device of this kind against which countermeasures cannot be taken. Not only can the devices themselves be neutralized, but sometimes they can be turned against those who install them. Once they have been detected, it is often profitable to leave them in place in order to feed the other side with false or misleading information.

The Field of Cryptography

An area of intelligence which is only partly a technological matter is that of cryptography. Codes and ciphers have been used throughout history, and attempts have always been made to break them. Today scientific knowledge is used to aid those who work in this field. No nation ever willingly reveals its current successes or failures in cryptography, but there are many instances from the recent past now in the public domain that serve to illustrate the important role that the deciphering of coded messages has played in the collection of intelligence.

The diplomatic service, the armed forces and the intelligence service of every country all use secret codes and ciphers to transmit their long-distance communications between headquarters

and posts abroad. For a gift to a country, the commercial cable lines or radio, in which case they know that any other government can generally obtain copies of the enciphered cables sent from or to its area and can intercept and record radio traffic passing from, to or over its territory. That much is easy; the problem is to decipher such material. Since the contents of official government messages on sensitive subjects, especially in times of crisis, constitute the best and "hottest" intelligence that one government can hope to gather about another, every government goes to great lengths to invent unbreakable codes and to protect its code materials and its cryptographic personnel. For that reason, every intelligence service is continually on the alert for opportunities which will give it access to cryptographic materials of other governments. Should these be obtained, the task of breaking a code is made easier. But there are other, less dramatic, methods, for some codes and ciphers can be broken by mathematical analysis of intercepted traffic.

The uncontrollable accidents and disasters of war sometimes expose to one opponent cryptographic materials used by the other. A headquarters or an outpost may be overrun and in the heat of retreat code books left behind. Many notable instances of this kind in World War I gave the British a lifesaving insight into the military and diplomatic intentions of the Germans. Early in the war the Russians sank the German cruiser "Magdeburg" and rescued from the arms of a drowning sailor the German naval code book, which was promptly turned over to their British allies. British salvage operations on sunken German submarines turned

from a raid over England, ran into a storm and were downed over France. Among the materials retrieved from them were coded maps and code books used by German U-boats in the Atlantic.

Military operations based on breaking of codes will often tip off the enemy, however. Once the Germans noticed that their submarines were being spotted and cornered with unusual and startling frequency, it was not hard for them to guess that communications with their underwater fleet were being read. As a result, all codes were immediately changed. There is always the problem, then, of how to act on information derived in this manner. One can risk terminating the usefulness of the source in order to obtain an immediate military or diplomatic gain, or one can hold back and continue to accumulate an ever-broadening knowledge of the enemy's movements and actions in order eventually to inflict the greatest possible damage.

The "Black Chamber"

During World War I the first serious American cryptographic undertaking was launched under the aegis of the War Department. Officially known as Section 8 of Military Intelligence, it liked to call itself the Black Chamber, the name used for centuries by the secret organs of postal censorship of the major European nations. Working from scratch, a group of brilliant amateurs under the direction of Herbert Yardley, a former telegraph operator, had by 1918 become a first-rate professional outfit. One of its outstanding achievements after World War I was the breaking of the Japanese diplomatic codes. During negotiations at the Washington Disarmament Conference in 1921, the United States wanted very much to get Japanese agreement to a 10:6 naval ratio. The Japanese came to the conference with the stated intention of holding to a 10:7 ratio. In diplomacy, as in any kind of bargaining, you are at a tremendous advantage if you know your opponent is prepared to retreat to secondary positions if necessary. Decipherment of the Japanese diplomatic traffic between Washington and Tokyo by the Black Chamber revealed to our government that the Japanese were actually ready to back down to the desired ratio if we forced the issue. So we were able to force it without risking a breakup of the conference over the issue.

The Chamber remained intact, serving chiefly the State Department, until 1929 when Henry Stimson, who had become Secretary of State under President Hoover, refused to allow his department to avail itself further of its services, after which, it had to close down. "Gentlemen," so Stimson claimed, "do not read each other's mail." Later, however, while serving as Secretary of War under President Roosevelt during World War II, he came to recognize the overriding importance of intelligence, especially cryptographic intelligence.

When the fate of a nation is at stake and the lives of its military men are in the balance, gentlemen do read each other's mail—if they can get their hands on it.

Our navy had, fortunately, begun to address itself to the problems of cryptography in the early 1920s, with particular emphasis on the Japanese, since U.S. naval thinking at that time foresaw Japan as the major potential foe of the United States. By 1941, the year of Pearl Harbor, navy cryptographers had broken most of the important Japanese naval and diplomatic codes and ciphers; and later we were often able to forecast Japanese action in the Pacific before it took place. The battle of Midway in June 1942, the turning point of the naval war in the Pacific, was an engagement our navy sought because it was able to learn from intercepted messages that a major task force of the Imperial Japanese Navy was gathering off Midway. Our information concerning its strength, disposition and intention gave Admiral Nimitz the advantage of surprise. Our successes in breaking

U.S. marine corps bombers attacking the "Mogami" during the battle of Midway
Wide World



Japanese codes were made public after World War II. From the point of view of an intelligence officer this was undoubtedly regrettable.

One of the most spectacular of all cryptographic coups in the field of diplomacy was the British decipherment of the so-called Zimmermann telegram in January 1917, when the United States was on the brink of World War I. The job of decipherment was performed by the experts of "Room 40," as British naval cryptographic headquarters was called. The message had originated with German Foreign Secretary Zimmermann in Berlin and was addressed to the German Minister in Mexico City. It outlined the German plan for the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare on Feb. 1, 1917, stated the probability that this would bring the United States into the war and proposed that Mexico enter the war on Germany's side; with victory, Mexico would regain its "lost territory in Texas, New Mexico and Arizona."

The famous Admiral Hall, Chief of British Naval Intelligence, had this message in his hands for over a month after its interception. His problem was how to pass its deciphered contents to the Americans in a manner that would convince them of its authenticity yet would prevent the Germans from learning of British competence in breaking their codes. Finally, and without any satisfactory solution having been found, the urgency of the war situation caused Lord Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, to communicate the Zimmermann message formally to the American Ambassador in London. The receipt of the message in Washington caused a sensation at the White House and State Department, and created serious problems for our government—how to verify beyond a doubt the validity of the message and how to make it public without letting it seem merely an Anglo-American ploy to get the United States into the war. Robert Lansing, who was then Secretary of State, and was an uncle of mine, later told me about the dramatic events of the next few days which brought America much closer to war.

Diplomatic Cables Abused

The situation was complicated by the fact that the Germans had transmitted the message via their ambassador in Washington, Count Bernstorff, who relayed it to his colleague in Mexico City, and that they used American diplomatic cable facilities to do so. President Wilson had granted the Germans the privilege of utilizing our communication lines between Europe and America on the understanding that messages to their representatives in the western hemisphere would be devoted to furthering the possibility of the peace which Wilson was so earnestly trying to mediate at the time. The President's chagrin was therefore all the greater when he discovered to what end the Germans had been exploiting his good offices. However, this curious arrangement turned out to be of great advantage in what happened next. First of all, it meant that the State Department had in its possession a copy of the encoded Zimmermann telegram which it had passed to Bernstorff—unaware, of course, of its inflammatory contents. Once this copy was identified, it was forwarded to our embassy in London, where one of Admiral Hall's men re-deciphered it for us in the presence of an embassy representative, thus verifying beyond a doubt its true contents. Secondly, the fact that deciphered copies of the telegram had been seen by German diplomats in both Washington and Mexico City helped significantly to solve the all-important problem that had caused Admiral Hall so much worry, namely, how to deceive the Germans about the real source from which we had obtained the information. In the end the impression given the Germans was that the famous message had leaked as a result of some carelessness or theft in one of the German embassies which had received copies of it. They continued using the same codes, which displayed a remarkable but welcome lack of imagination on their

part. In March of 1917, the State Department released the telegram to the Associated Press. It hit the American public like a bombshell. In April we declared war on Germany.

Intelligence Requires Guidance

I have described some of the manifold activities involved in gathering intelligence. The diverse needs for information and the varying opportunities for acquiring it make it imperative that some orderly system govern the world-wide collection process. Without appropriate guidance, intelligence officers in the field could spend much of their time duplicating each other's work and could exert disproportionate efforts in the attempt to get information in one place that could be obtained much more simply and quickly in another. It is the task of the intelligence headquarters, with its world perspective, to establish the basic guidelines along which intelligence officers in different places try to pattern their work. This is accomplished, for long-range purposes, by setting up a list of priorities that give the order of importance of tasks to be undertaken in any one area. It also often happens that headquarters will assign crash jobs to intelligence officers in areas where it is believed that much-needed information might be available.

The function of headquarters was illustrated when Khrushchev made his secret speech denouncing Stalin to the twentieth Party Congress in 1956. It was clear from various press and other references to the speech that a text must be available somewhere. The speech was too long and too detailed to have been made extemporaneously even by Khrushchev, who is noted for lengthy extemporaneous remarks. An intelligence "document hunt" was instituted and eventually the text of the speech was found—but many miles from Moscow. It was necessary in this case for headquarters to alert all possible sources and to make sure all clues were followed up to produce this intelligence coup for the west.

Forbidden Fruit

There are also times when headquarters must perform a negative function, warning its agents to avoid material—no matter how valuable it may seem—in order not to jeopardize some other intelligence source. When I was stationed in Switzerland during World War II, I received an instruction not to try to obtain any foreign codes without prior instructions. I did not know it at the time, but shortly beforehand an attempt by our intelligence to get a German code in Portugal had so alerted the Germans that they changed a code we were already reading.

Soon afterward one of my most trusted German agents, who spoke with authority, told me that if I wished, he could get me detailed information about their diplomatic codes and ciphers. This put me in quite a quandary. If I showed no interest, this would have been a giveaway that we had them already; no intelligence officer would otherwise reject such an offer. I expressed great interest and sparred for time to think over how this could best be worked out. The next day I told him that as all my traffic to Washington had to go by radio (Switzerland was surrounded, in late 1942, by Nazi and Fascist forces) it would be too difficult and too perilous for me to communicate what he might give me on the German codes. I said I should prefer to wait till France was liberated—the Normandy invasion had already taken place—so I could send out his code information by diplomatic pouch. He readily accepted this somewhat specious answer. Sometimes even the seemingly ripest apples of intelligence should not be plucked.

In a world where so many countries have some kind of representation abroad and where trade and travel occur in the most unpredictable patterns, no intelligence service and no intelligence officer rules out the possibility of the random and unexpected and often inexplicable windfall. This happens despite the

best-planned get something on his mind feels safer about talking to an intelligence officer 10,000 miles away from home, so he waits for the opportunity of a trip abroad to seek one out. Suddenly Korea may become the place where one picks up valuable information on Czechoslovakia. It can happen that way.

A final word on the craft of intelligence as it is practised today requires comparison of the open and the closed society. Each in its distinctive way contains weaknesses of which an opposing intelligence service can take advantage, and strengths which make the opponent's job more difficult. Altogether it must be said that in our open society we make it far too easy for our opponents to learn of our military secrets. Much that we can acquire from the Soviets only through an enormous investment of manpower and money, they can get from us merely by reading what we publish.

Some years ago my predecessor as director of the CIA, General Walter Bedell Smith, was disturbed by this situation and decided to make a test. He co-opted the services of a group of able and qualified academicians from one of our large universities for some summer work. He asked them to examine open publications, news articles, hearings of the Congress, government releases, monographs, speeches and the like, in order to determine what kind of estimate of U.S. military capabilities the Soviets could put together from unclassified sources. Their conclusions indicated that in a few weeks of work by a task force on the open literature our opponents could acquire a very good general idea of our order of battle.

But when it comes to clandestine collection of intelligence—and neither side can depend wholly on overt intelligence—then our opponents' agents run up against the FBI and other law-enforcement agencies in this country. Our system also provides other obstacles which are inherent and require no special effort on our part—our free society does not breed deep-set and widespread disaffection, as does the Communist society. Even though we have had a share of "ideological" Communists and cases of entrapment, the Soviets have today no large pool of malcontents and haters of our system from which to draw when they look for resident agents. They know that the local Communist party is too closely watched to recommend it for clandestine work.

Communist Mind Isolated

It is also a fact that the closed society produces the kind of isolated mentality that cannot understand the workings and the mentality of a free society. The same "wall" that Soviet citizens carry with them when they go abroad, which makes it difficult for us to get close to them, tends to cut them off from the societies and governments they wish to penetrate. For one thing, they often consider much of the overt intelligence available to them as intentional deception—their own suspicion betrays them. Their judgment of the true loyalties of prospective recruits is often bad. When they approach nationals of western European and North American countries under the impression that they have found a willing source, they often discover that their names are in the papers soon afterwards because the source was not really willing at all. Hundreds of Americans of Russian and east European origin whom the Soviets or their satellites have tried to approach have reported such approaches to our authorities immediately after they were made.

An outstanding case of this kind was that of the Rumanian V. C. Georgescu. In 1953, shortly after Georgescu's escape from Communist Rumania and while he was seeking U.S. citizenship, a Communist intelligence agent acting under Soviet guidance made a cruel attempt to blackmail him. Georgescu was given to understand that if he would agree to perform certain intelligence tasks in the United States, his two young sons, who were still

in Rumania, would be released and returned to their parents. Otherwise he could expect never to see his sons again. Georgescu courageously refused any discussion of the subject, threw the man out of his office and reported the full details to the FBI. The Communist agent, who was in the diplomatic service, was expelled from the United States. The whole case received such wide publicity that Rumania finally sought to repair its damaged prestige by acceding to President Eisenhower's personal request for the release of the boys.

The ease with which the Soviets can place their intelligence officers in Western countries is an enormous advantage for their intelligence work. I have already described how the Soviets use their embassies and trade missions abroad for cover. They also use their mission at the United Nations and have even placed their intelligence personnel in such bodies as the sacrosanct Secretariat of the United Nations, whose employees are supposed to be international civil servants. Recently two Soviets were expelled from this body and from the United States for their attempt to recruit a politician of the state of New York who reported the whole incident to the FBI. To the Soviets, no international organization is sacrosanct.

These advantages which the Soviets have in the West cannot be matched behind the Iron Curtain. There are no immigrants and few long-term visitors to the Soviet Union. So far, no international body has chosen to settle there or has been invited to do so. A Soviet citizen cannot walk into a foreign embassy without having to explain later to the police what he was doing there. The Soviet people are taught to distrust the foreigner (although they do not always follow instructions) and the Soviet internal police have the mission of seeing to it that the foreigner does not get into sensitive areas. Under these conditions, espionage operations are difficult to initiate from scratch behind the Iron Curtain. The possibility that agents can be sought and found and cultivated there without the knowledge of local police is so limited that no intelligence service is going to try to solve many of its problems by this means. Fortunately, there are other ways of achieving the objectives of intelligence collection.

Our free societies, with all their blessings, cannot be made over merely to even the balance sheet of intelligence. But some of the loopholes, some indiscretions, some of the carelessness in our handling of public information can possibly be dealt with more effectively than they are today.

V. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

I have emphasized that in today's spy-conscious world each side tries to make the acquisition of intelligence by its opponent as difficult as possible by taking "security measures" in order to protect classified information, vital installations and personnel from enemy penetration. I have also indicated that these measures, while indispensable as basic safeguards, become in the end a challenge to the opponent's intelligence technicians to devise even more ingenious ways of getting around the obstacles.

Clearly, if a country wishes to protect itself against the unceasing encroachments of hostile intelligence services it must do more than keep an eye on foreign travelers crossing its borders, more than placing guards around its "sensitive" areas, more than checking on the loyalty of its employees in sensitive positions. It must also find out what the intelligence services of hostile countries are after, how they are proceeding and what people they are using. It can best accomplish these tasks by penetrating the inner circle of hostile services where the plans are made and the agents selected and trained, and, if the job can be managed, by bringing over to its side "insiders" from the other camp.

Operations having this distinct aim belong to the field of counterespionage and the information that is derived from them is

called counterintelligence. Counterespionage is inherently a protective and defensive operation. Its primary purpose is to protect against one's country. Given the nature of Communist espionage, however, counterespionage on our side inevitably entails the uncovering of secret aggression, subversion, sabotage, kidnapping, even assassination. Although such information is not, like positive intelligence, of direct use to the government in the formation of policy, it often alerts the government to the nature of the threats of its opponents and the area in which political action is being planned. On October 30, 1962, U.S. and Venezuelan officials monitored a secret Cuban radio signal directing acts of terrorism against the Venezuelan oil fields. Before adequate preventive action could be taken saboteurs, believed to be Communists, succeeded in doing serious damage to the oil production facilities there. Here counterintelligence helped mitigate the damage and pinpointed the Cuban source of the threat. This allowed better protective action to be taken for the future.

The function of counterespionage is assigned to various U.S. agencies, each of which has a special area of responsibility. The CIA's province is the territory of the United States itself; this organization guards against the hostile activities of foreign agents on our own soil. The CIA has the major responsibility for counterespionage outside the United States, thereby constituting a forward line of defense against foreign espionage—it attempts to detect the operations of hostile intelligence before the agents reach their targets. Each branch of the armed forces also has a counterintelligence arm whose purpose is mainly to protect its commands, technical establishments and personnel both at home and abroad against enemy penetration.

Co-ordination of Agencies

The effectiveness of this division of labour depends upon the co-ordination of the separate agencies and on the rapid dissemination of counterintelligence information from one to the other. The case of the Soviet "illegal" Colonel Rudolf Abel supplies an illustration of this co-ordination. A close associate and co-worker of Colonel Abel's in the United States was on his way back to the Soviet Union to make his report. While in western Europe, he decided to defect. He contacted a U.S. intelligence office in a country where he felt it safe to do so, showing an American passport obtained on the basis of a false birth certificate. He told a fantastic story of espionage in the United States, including specifics as to secret caches of funds, communication among agents, his network and certain details regarding Colonel Abel. All this information was immediately transmitted to Washington and passed to the FBI for verification. The agent's story stood up in every respect. He was brought back quietly and willingly to the United States. As soon as he reached our shores, the primary responsibility for handling the investigation and legal procedures in the case was transferred to the FBI and the Department of Justice. The case had originated abroad with CIA which continued to handle its foreign angles.

The traditional purposes of counterespionage are "to locate, identify and neutralize" the opposition. In more specific terms, this means to find out where and who the hostile spy is—and possibly the spymaster, too—in order to thwart his work and eventually to put him out of business. "Neutralizing" can take many forms. Within the United States an apprehended spy can be prosecuted under the law; so can a foreign intelligence officer who is caught red-handed having contact with agents, provided he does not have diplomatic immunity. If he has immunity he can only be expelled. But there are other ways of neutralizing agents, and one of the best is by exposure or the threat of exposure. A spy is not of much further use once his name, face and story are in the papers.

Counterespionage operations are often compared to chess, and



Wide World

Soviet spy Rudolf Abel in his cell in the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, N.Y., after his arraignment in Aug. 1957. Col. Abel's detection and arrest were brought about by co-ordination between the CIA, which first got the tip in Europe, and the FBI and the Justice department, which handled the case in the U.S.

the Soviets are notoriously good chess players. These operations require enormous patience and adroitness. They may take months to plan and years to bring to fruition. Our target is massive and diverse, for the Soviets use not only their own intelligence apparatus in their operations against us but also those of their European satellites—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria—all of whom are old in the ways of espionage. Chinese Communist espionage and counterespionage operations are largely independent of Moscow, though many of their senior personnel were schooled by Soviet intelligence.

The most sophisticated operations of counterespionage, and the most rewarding if they succeed, are directed against the staff and the installations of the opponent's intelligence service. One of the most famous cases in history was that of Col. Alfred Redl, who from 1900 to 1907 was chief of counterespionage in the Austro-Hungarian Empire's military intelligence service, and was later its representative in Prague. From 1902 until the time he was unmasked in 1913, Redl actually had been a secret agent of the Russians and had revealed to them everything he knew of his own country's intelligence operations—in this case, almost everything there was to know. But that wasn't all. As a leading officer of the intelligence service, Redl was a member of the General Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army and had access to all the General Staff's war plans. These too he gave to the Russians.

Redl had been blackmailed into working for the Russians early in his career on the basis of two weaknesses—homosexuality and overwhelming venality.

Today, when the headquarters of an intelligence service is as "impenetrable" as the best minds assigned to the task can make it, counterespionage usually aims at more accessible and vulnerable targets. These are chiefly the offices and units that intelligence services maintain in foreign countries from which their field operations in espionage and counterespionage are directed. In the case of the Soviets, such offices are often located in embassies, consulates and trade delegations. These locations provide "cover"; i.e., they conceal the intelligence unit and at the same time afford its members the protection of diplomatic immunity.

A factor which counterespionage exploits is the need and desire of the opposing side for information, for positive intelligence. If a stranger walks into an embassy in the Free World and with a worried look on his face goes up to the receptionist and tells her in a hoarse whisper that he has some important information which he would like to put into the hands of the "right person," it is likely that he will sooner or later be talking to the "right person." No intelligence service can afford to turn away such an offer of information, not, at least, without giving it careful scrutiny. Some of the most crucial intelligence ever received has been delivered by people who unexpectedly walked into an embassy one day in just this fashion. Therefore, counterespionage often tries to "plant" an agent with the opposing service by fixing him up with information which will make him appear useful. It is hoped that the agent will get himself hired by the opposition on a long-term basis, become more and more trusted and will be given increasingly sensitive assignments.

The Soviets used this method against Allied intelligence offices in West Germany and Austria during the 1950s. Refugees from the East were so numerous at that time that it was necessary to employ the better-educated ones to help in the screening and interrogation of their fellow refugees. The Soviets determined to take advantage of this situation and cleverly inserted agents in the refugee channel, providing them with information about conditions behind the Curtain which could not fail to make them seem of great interest to Western intelligence. As a result, it later turned out that some people employed as interrogators and assistants were Soviet agents. Their task for the Soviets was to find out about our methods and targets, to get acquainted with our personnel and also to keep tabs on the countless refugees who innocently told them their stories.

Provocation Frequently Used

This same tactic can be used to quite a different end, namely, provocation, which has an ancient and dishonourable tradition. The term *agent provocateur* points to its origin in France where the device was formerly used during times of political unrest. But it was the Russians who made a fine art of provocation. It was the main technique of the tsarist Okhrana in smoking out revolutionaries and dissenters and was later taken over by the various Soviet police organs. In tsarist times an agent would join a subversive group and not only spy and report on it to the police, but also incite it to take some kind of action in order to give the police a pretext for swooping down on it and arresting some or all of its members. Since the agent reported to the police exactly when and where the action was going to take place, they had no problems.

Actually, such operations could become immensely subtle, complicated and dramatic. The more infamous of the tsarist *agents provocateurs* have all the earmarks of characters out of Dostoevski. In order to incite a revolutionary group to the action that would bring the police down on it, the *provocateur* himself had to play the role of revolutionary leader and terrorist. If the police

insisted to build up a group on serious charges, then the revolutionary group had to do something extreme, something more serious than merely holding clandestine meetings. As a result, we encounter some astounding situations in the Russia of the early 1900s.

The most notorious of all tsarist *provocateurs*, the agent Azeff, appears to have originated the idea of murdering the tsar's uncle, the Grand Duke Sergius, and the Minister of the Interior, Plehve. These murders were actually committed by the terrorists at the instigation of Azeff solely for the sake of giving the Okhrana the opportunity of arresting them. One of Lenin's closest associates from 1912 until the Revolution, Roman Malinovsky, was a tsarist police agent and *provocateur*, suspected by Lenin's entourage but always defended by Lenin. Malinovsky did his share of revealing the whereabouts of secret printing presses, secret meetings and the conspiracies of the revolutionaries to the police, but his main achievement was far more dramatic. Since he openly played the role of an active Bolshevik, he got himself elected, with police assistance and with Lenin's blessing, as representative to the Russian parliament, the Duma, where he led the Bolshevik faction and distinguished himself as an orator. The police often had to ask him to restrain the revolutionary ardour of his speeches. Indeed, there is some question in the cases of both Azeff and Malinovsky as to where their allegiance really lay. Since each played his role so well, he seems frequently to have been carried away by it and to have believed in it, at least temporarily.

Officials and Newsmen Targets

Today provocation is chiefly an operation of security services behind the Iron Curtain directed against foreign intelligence officers and diplomatic personnel. It may also be employed against newsmen or even casual tourists, either to get rid of a reporter who knows too much or to create the image of massive Western espionage against the Soviet Union. It is sometimes even used as a basis for blackmail. The usual method is to provoke the victim into an illegal or degrading act, to expose or blackmail him and make him liable to prosecution or to expulsion if he is protected by diplomatic immunity. Of course, when blackmail is involved there is no disclosure if the target agrees to "play the game."

When you read in the paper that an individual has been expelled from one of the Soviet bloc countries, frequently this is either a case of a completely arbitrary charge being made or else it is the result of a provocation. The routine goes like this: one day the target is contacted at home, in a restaurant, on the street or even in his office by a member of the "underground" or by someone who feigns dissatisfaction with the regime. The *provocateur* offers important information. If the target bites and takes up contact with the man, he may be unpleasantly surprised during the course of one of his meetings by the sudden intervention of the local security police. The *provocateur* is "arrested" for giving information to a foreign power. The target himself may find his name in the paper; if he is a diplomatic official his embassy will receive a request from the local foreign office that he leave the country within 24 hours.

What is gained through this technique is that if the victim really was engaged in the collection of intelligence, then the Soviet Union is rid of him and has also served warning that it will not put up with any kind of snooping. His replacement will probably restrict himself accordingly. He will certainly be careful about offers from the "underground." And if the victim is a private citizen knowledgeable in the ways and wiles of Communism, then the Soviet will have deprived the West of another person whose advice and counsel would be useful to us.

The most characteristic tool of counterespionage operations is the double agent, and he comes in many guises. In an area like West Germany, with its concentration of technical and military

installations of both the German Federal Republic and NATO, there is a steady flood of agents. Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP84-00161R000100170005-7
airfields, supply depots, factories, United States military posts and the like. Many of these agents are caught. Many give themselves up for a variety of personal motives. Such agents become doubles when they can be persuaded to continue the appearance of working for the Soviet bloc but under Western "control." Soviet agents who are caught by Western officials often agree to become double agents because they find it preferable to sitting in jail for a couple of years.

Using the Double Agent

In order to "build up" a double agent of this kind he is allowed to report harmless positive information back to his original employers, the Soviets. It is hoped that the latter, pleased with his success in acquiring information, will give him new briefs and directives. Such briefs in themselves are counterintelligence information because they show us what the opponent wants to know and how he is going about getting it. Sometimes it is possible, through such an agent, to lure a courier, another agent or even an intelligence officer into the West. When this happens, one has the choice of simply watching the movements of the visitor—hoping he will lead to other agents concealed in the West—or of arresting him. If he is arrested, the operation is naturally over, but it has succeeded in neutralizing another person working for the opposition.

A more valuable double for our counterintelligence is the resident of a Western country who, when approached by the Soviet or other bloc intelligence service to undertake a mission for them, quietly reports the encounter to his own authorities. The advantages are twofold. The Soviets rarely approach a Westerner unless they have something serious in mind. Secondly, the voluntary act of the person approached in reporting this event points to his trustworthiness. In such a case the target of Soviet recruitment will usually be told by his own intelligence authorities to "accept" the Soviet offer and to feign co-operation, meanwhile reporting all the activities and missions which he undertakes for the Soviets. He is provided with "reports" which his principals desire to have fed to the Soviets. This game can then be played until the Soviets begin to have some reason to suspect their "agent," or until the agent can no longer stand the strain.

The case of the late Boris Morros, the Hollywood director, was of this kind. Through Morros, who had checked in with the FBI early in the game, the Soviets ran a network of extremely important agents in the United States, most of them in political and intellectual circles. Morros reported on them regularly to the FBI.

Surveillance Must Be Covert

"Surveillance" is the professional word for shadowing or tailing. Like every act of counterespionage, it must be executed with maximum care lest its target become aware of it. A criminal who feels or knows he is being followed has limited possibilities open to him. The best he can hope for is to elude surveillance long enough to find a good hiding place. But an intelligence agent, once he has been alarmed by surveillance, will take steps to leave the country, and he will have plenty of assistance in doing so.

The purpose of surveillance in counterespionage is twofold. If a person is only suspected of being an enemy agent, close observation of his actions over a period of time may lead to further facts that confirm the suspicion and supply details about the agent's mission and how he is carrying it out. Secondly, an agent is rarely entirely on his own. Eventually he will get in touch, by one means or another, with his helpers, his sources, and perhaps the people from whom he is taking orders. Surveillance at its best will uncover the network to which he belongs and the channels through which he reports.

The British roundup of five Soviet agents in the Lonsdale ring surveillance. Henry Houghton, an Admiralty employee, was suspected of passing classified information to an unidentified foreign power. Scotland Yard observed him meeting with another man on a London street, but the encounter was so brief it was impossible to tell for certain whether anything had passed between them or whether they had even spoken to each other. However, the fact that both men acted so furtive and were apparently extremely wary of surveillance convinced the British that they were on the right track. The Yard had enough trained men in the immediate area to have the second man followed as well. He eventually led them, after many days of tireless and well-concealed surveillance, to a harmless-looking American couple who operated a second-hand bookstore. The role, if any, of this couple could not be immediately ascertained.

On a later occasion Houghton came up to London again, this time with his girl friend, who worked in the same naval establishment. While under surveillance, the two of them, walking down the street carrying a market bag, were approached from the rear by the same man as before. He was ready to relieve Houghton and the girl of the market bag, clearly a prearranged method for passing the "goods."

Three at one swoop, all caught in the act, was something the police could not afford to pass up, and the three were arrested on the spot. A few hours later, the American couple met the same fate. The man Houghton met was Gordon Lonsdale, the Soviet "illegal" with Canadian papers who was running the show. The Americans had previously been sought by the FBI for their part in a Soviet net in the United States and had disappeared when things had become too hot for them here. In London they had been operating a secret transmitter to relay Lonsdale's information to Moscow. Microfilms found in their apartment eventually led to the apprehension of John Vassall, another Admiralty employee. Good counterespionage operatives never close in on an agent without first having exhausted all the possibilities of locating and identifying everyone else associated with the agent.

A Bonanza for Intelligence

One of the biggest bonanzas for counterespionage is the defection of a staff intelligence officer of the opposition. It provides the equivalent of a direct penetration of hostile headquarters for a period of time. One such intelligence "volunteer" can paralyze for months to come the service he left behind. He can describe the internal and external organization of his service and the work and character of many of his former colleagues at headquarters. He can identify some intelligence personnel stationed abroad under cover. Best of all, he can deliver information about operations. He is not likely to know the true identity of a large number of agents, of course, for all intelligence services compartmentalize such information, and only the few officers intimately concerned with a case will know exactly who the agents on that case are.

The West has been singularly lucky in having many of these bonanzas in the course of recent history. In 1937 two of Stalin's top intelligence officers stationed abroad defected rather than return to Russia to be swallowed up in the purge of the N.K.V.D. One was Walter Krivitsky, who had been chief of Soviet intelligence in Holland. In 1941 he was found dead in a Washington hotel, shot by unknown agents, presumably Soviet, who were never apprehended. I shall never accept the story that he committed suicide. The second was Alexander Orlov, who had been one of the N.K.V.D. chiefs in Spain at the time of the civil war. Unlike Krivitsky, he has managed to elude Soviet vengeance.

An early postwar Soviet defection was that of Igor Gouzenko, a member of Soviet military intelligence, who had been in charge

*Wide World*

Head in shadow is that of Peter Deriabin, former major in the Soviet secret police, who sought asylum in the West in 1954. At left, Associated Press reporter Ray Shaw. Interviewed in 1959, Deriabin permitted no pictures of his face, even though he was wearing a disguise

of codes and ciphers in the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa. Thanks in large part to information Gouzenko brought with him, the most lethal of all Soviet espionage efforts, to procure the secrets of the atom bomb, was stopped.

The years 1954-55 were the occasion of multiple desertions. After Stalin's death and the liquidation of Beria shortly afterward, it was clear that anyone prominent in the Soviet security service was in jeopardy. Among the major defections to the West at that time were those of Vladimir Petrov, who had been K.G.B. chief in Australia; Juri Rastvorov, an intelligence officer stationed at the Soviet Mission in Japan; and Peter Deriabin, who defected from his post in Vienna. All of these men had at one time or another been stationed at intelligence headquarters in Moscow and possessed valuable information that went far beyond their assignments at the time they defected.

Two defections of a special kind that have occurred in recent years involved Soviet intelligence personnel employed on assassination missions. Nikolay Khokhlov was sent from Moscow to West Germany in early 1954 to arrange for the murder of a prominent anti-Soviet *émigré* leader, Georgi Okolovich. Khokhlov told Okolovich of his mission and then defected. At Munich in 1957, Soviet agents tried without success to poison Khokhlov. In the fall of 1961, Bogdan Stashinskiy defected in West Germany and confessed that on Soviet orders he had murdered the two Ukrainian exile leaders Rebet and Bandera some years earlier

in Munich.

Recently, Soviet diplomat Aleksandr Kaznachayev defected in Burma, where he had been stationed. While Kaznachayev was not a staff member of Soviet intelligence, he was a "co-opted worker" and was used in intelligence work whenever his position as a diplomat enabled him to perform certain tasks with less risk of discovery than his colleagues in the intelligence branch. His recent book describing what went on in the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon has done a great deal to debunk the picture of Soviet skill and American incompetence previously impressed on the American public in the book *The Ugly American*.

All the important intelligence "volunteers" have not been Soviets. Numerous high-ranking staff officers have defected from the satellite countries and were able to contribute information not only about their own services but about Soviet intelligence as well, for the Soviets manage and direct the satellite services, not at long range but in person. They do this through a so-called advisory system. A Soviet "advisor" is installed in almost every department and section of the satellite intelligence services, be it in Prague, Warsaw, Bucharest, or any other satellite capital. This advisor is supposed to be shown all significant material concerning the work being done, and must give his consent to all important operational undertakings. He is to all intents and purposes a supervisor, and his word is final.

As a sidelight on Soviet relations to its satellites, and as an

excellent example of counterespionage techniques, it is interesting to note that the Soviets do not rely wholly on these advisors to control the satellite intelligence services. This is not because the latter are incompetent, but because the satellite services are evidently not trusted by their Soviet masters. In order to prevent these services from getting away with anything, the Soviets go to the trouble of secretly recruiting intelligence officers of the satellite services who can supply them with information on plans, personnel, conflicts in the local management, disaffection and the like, which might not have come to the attention of the advisor.

Key Satellite Aides Fled

Joseph Swiatlo, who defected in 1954, had been chief of the department of the Polish intelligence service which kept tabs on members of the Polish government and the Polish Communist party. Pawel Monat had been Polish military attaché in Washington from 1955 to 1958, after which he returned to Warsaw and was put in charge of world-wide collection of information by Polish military attachés. He served in this job for two years before defecting in 1959. Frantisek Tisler defected to us after having served as Czech military attaché in Washington from 1957 to 1959. The Hungarian secret police officer Bela Lapusnyik made a daring escape to freedom over the Austria-Hungary border in May of 1961 and reached Vienna safely, only to die of poisoning, apparently at the hands of Soviet agents, before he could tell his full story to Western authorities.

What has brought all these men over to our side is naturally a matter of great interest not only to Western intelligence but to any serious student of the Soviet system and of Soviet life.

Revelations by Vladimir Petrov, Soviet embassy official who had acted as the Soviet's espionage chief in Australia until he became disillusioned with communism, set off a major investigation in 1954. Petrov and his wife, who had also served as an espionage officer, were granted sanctuary in Australia.



Wide World

Jozef Swiatlo, Polish security official who turned against communism in 1954 and was given asylum in the U.S.

Gouzenko, as code clerk for Soviet intelligence, saw all the traffic that passed back and forth between the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa and Soviet intelligence headquarters in Moscow during World War II. He has told how he was gradually overcome by shame and repugnance as he began to realize that the U.S.S.R., while a wartime ally of Britain, Canada and the United States, was mounting a tremendous espionage effort to steal their scientific secrets. The moral revulsion of the man on learning of Soviet machinations against its "friends" eventually led to his defection.

Soviet Insiders Disillusioned

The postwar defectors did not have similar motivation because the Soviets no longer affected friendship with the West after 1946. Every Soviet official was well indoctrinated on this point and could not easily survive in his job if he had any soft feelings about the "imperialists." Nevertheless, feelings akin to Gouzenko's seem to have inspired these defections. Many of these men suffered some disillusionment or disappointment with their own system.


When one studies the role the intelligence services play in the Soviet world and their closeness to the centres of power, it is not surprising that the Soviet intelligence officer gets an inside look, available to few, of the sinister and hypocritical methods of operation behind the façade of "socialist idealism." To the intelligent, dedicated Communist, such knowledge comes as a shock. One defector has told us, for example, that he could trace the disillusionment which later led to his own defection back to the day when he found out that Stalin and the K.G.B., and not the Germans, had been responsible for the Katyn massacre (the murder of 10,000 Polish officers during World War II). The Soviet public still does not know the truth about this or most of the other crimes of Stalin. This "loss of faith" in the system within which one is working, coupled often with personal disappointments,

seems to be the powerful driving factor in defection.

Of course, these names by no means exhaust the list of all those who have left the Soviet intelligence service and other Soviet posts. Some of the most important and also some of the most recent defectors have so far chosen not to be "surfaced." They too have made, and are making, a continual contribution to our inside knowledge of the work of the Soviet intelligence and security apparatus and of the way in which the subversive war is being carried on against us by Communism. There have also been defectors from Communist China.

Every effort is made to see to it that those who leave a Communist service are helped and assisted in every way, whether they openly acknowledge their previous connections or try to preserve

Soviet bombers over Moscow's Red Square during a May Day parade
Tikhomiroff—Magnum



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this country has always been a haven for those seeking to leave tyranny and espouse freedom, and it will continue to be a haven for those who do not wish to continue to work for the Kremlin and against the Free World.

VI. CONFUSING THE ADVERSARY

Sir Walter Scott, when he wrote the well-known lines

Oh, what a tangled web we weave,
When first we practice to deceive!

was not thinking of intelligence deception, but his words describe quite correctly what this kind of operation frequently entails. When one intentionally misleads, friends as well as foes are sometimes misled, and there is always the danger of subsequently not being believed when one wants to be. Deception is tricky business, especially in time of peace and in the absence of wartime controls. And deception is easier in the closed society, which can manipulate its information media and hide what it wants, where and when it wants.

In intelligence, the term deception covers a wide variety of maneuvers by which a state attempts to mislead another state, generally a potential or actual enemy, as to its own capabilities and intentions. Its best-known use is in wartime or just prior to the outbreak of war, when its main purpose is to draw enemy defenses away from a planned point of attack, or to give the impression that there will be no attack at all, or simply to confuse the opponent about one's plans and purposes. During the kind of peace we call the Cold War, various other forms of deception, including political deception, are practised against us by the Soviets. These involve the propagation of false and misleading information, the faking of documents and the use of forgeries. This is considered important enough so that a special section in the Soviet intelligence service called the "disinformation bureau" is responsible for mounting such operations.

Soviet Parades Used for Deception

Deception as to military capabilities is chiefly a short-range tactical maneuver gauged to conceal the possession or location of certain weapons—or, sometimes, the lack of them. The Soviets have used military parades to place armaments on display that are intended to draw attention away from other armaments they may have in their arsenal or may plan to have. Mock-ups of planes and other equipment never intended to be operational have also been exhibited. In 1955 the Soviets gave the impression, during an exhibition on Red Aviation Day, that they were emphasizing heavy bomber production, whereas in fact they were shifting their emphasis to missiles. Visiting diplomats and military observers were permitted to see a "fly-by" of heavy bombers in numbers far exceeding what was thought to be the available squadron strength in the area. The impression was thereby given that many more heavy bombers were coming off the assembly lines than we had calculated. Later it was learned that the same squadron of bombers had been flying around in circles, reappearing every few minutes with the intention of misleading the observers.

Deception techniques of this sort were utilized by both sides during World War II. Airfields in Britain were made to look like farms from the air. Sod was placed over the hangars and maintenance shacks were given the appearance of barns, sheds and outbuildings. Even more important, mock-ups were set up in other areas to look like real airfields with planes on them. Elsewhere mocked-up naval vessels were stationed where real ones might well have been.

As a strategic maneuver, deception operations generally require lengthy and careful preparation. One must ascertain what

the enemy thinks and what he expects. Success depends on the closest co-ordination between the supreme military command and the intelligence service. Thus these operations are always of major stature and are, for the most part, one-time gambles for high stakes. The intelligence problem is to get information into the hands of the enemy by some means and in some form so that he will believe a certain move is to be made by his opponent. The information itself must be plausible and not outside the practical range of plans that the enemy knows are capable of being put into operation.

After the Allies had driven the Germans out of North Africa in 1943, it was clear to all that their next move would be into southern Europe. The question was where. Since Sicily was an obvious stepping stone and was in fact the Allied objective, it was felt that every effort should be made to give the Germans and Italians the impression that the Allies were going to bypass it. To have tried to persuade the Germans that there was to be no attack at all or that it was going to move across Spain was out of the question, for these things would not have been credible. The deception had to point to something within the expected range.

The Contrived Accident

For quick and effective placement of plausible deception directly into the hands of the enemy's high command, few methods beat the "accident," so long as it seems logical and has all the appearances of being a wonderfully lucky break for the enemy. Such an accident was cleverly staged by the British in 1943 and it was no doubt accepted by the Germans at the time as completely genuine. Early in May of that year the corpse of a British major was found washed up on the southwest coast of Spain near the town of Huelva, between the Portuguese border and Gibraltar. A courier briefcase was still strapped to his wrist containing copies of correspondence to General Alexander in Tunisia from the Imperial General Staff. These papers clearly hinted at an Allied plan to invade southern Europe via Sardinia and Greece. As we learned after the war, the Germans fully believed these hints. Hitler sent an armoured division to Greece, and the Italian garrison on Sicily was not reinforced.

This was perhaps one of the best cases of deception utilizing a single move in recent intelligence history. It was called Operation "Mincemeat," and the story of its execution has been fully told by one of the main planners of the affair, Ewen Montagu, in the book *The Man Who Never Was*. It was a highly sophisticated feat, made possible by the circumstances of modern warfare and the techniques of modern science. There was nothing illogical about the possibility that a plane on which an officer carrying important documents was a passenger could have come down, or that a body from the crash could have been washed up on the Spanish shore.

A British Major's Corpse

Actually, a recently dead civilian was used for this operation. He was dressed in the uniform of a British major; in his pockets were all the identification papers, calling cards and odds and ends necessary to authenticate him as Major Martin. He was floated into Spain from a British submarine, which surfaced close enough to the Spanish coast to make sure that he would reach his target without fail. And he did.

"Overlord," the combined Allied invasion of Normandy, in June 1944, also made effective use of deception—in this case not an isolated ruse but a variety of misleading maneuvers closely co-ordinated with each other. These succeeded, as is well known, in keeping the Germans guessing as to the exact area of the intended Allied landing. False rumours were circulated among our own troops on the theory that German agents in England would

pick them up and report them. Radio channels to agents in the French underground were utilized to pass deceptive orders and requests for action to back up the coming Allied landings; it was known that certain of these agents were under the control of the Germans and would pass on to them messages received from the Allies. Such agents therefore constituted a direct channel to the German intelligence service. In order to make the Germans think that the landings would take place in the Le Havre area, agents in the vicinity were asked to make certain observations, thereby indicating to the Germans a heightened Allied interest in fortifications, rail traffic, etc. Lastly, military reconnaissance itself was organized in such a way as to emphasize an urgent interest in places where the attack would not come. Fewer aerial reconnaissance sorties were flown over the Normandy beaches than over Le Havre and other likely areas.

There are essentially two ways of planting deceptive information with the enemy. One can stage the kind of accident the British did in Spain. Such accidents are plausible because they do, after all, frequently occur solely as a result of the misfortunes of war. History is full of instances where couriers, loaded with important dispatches, fell into enemy hands. The other way is to plant an agent with the enemy who is ostensibly reporting to him about your plans. He can be a "deserter," or some kind of "neutral." The problem, as in all counterespionage penetrations, is to get the enemy to trust the agent. He cannot simply turn up with dramatic military information and expect to be believed.

Captured Radio Put to Use

A wholly modern deception channel came into being with the use of radio. For example, a parachutist lands in enemy territory equipped with a portable transmitter and is captured. He confesses he has been sent on a mission to spy on enemy troop movements and to communicate with his intelligence headquarters by radio. Such an agent stands a good chance of being shot after making this confession; he may be shot before he has a chance to make it. The probability is high, however, that his captors will decide he is more useful alive than dead because his radio provides a direct channel for feeding deception to the opponent's intelligence service. If the intelligence service that sent the agent knows, however, that he has been captured and is under enemy control, it can continue to send him questions with the intent of deceiving the other side. If it asks for a report on troop concentrations in sector A, it gives the impression that some military action is planned there. This was one tactic used by the Allies in preparation for the Normandy landings.

The mounting of strategic deception requires the complete co-operation and the complete security of all parts of government engaged in the effort. For this reason, large-scale deception is difficult for a democratic government except under wartime controls. For the Soviets, of course, the situation is different. With their centralized organization and complete control of the information media within their country they can support a deception operation far more efficiently than a free country can. When a Soviet diplomat drops a remark in deepest confidence to a colleague from a neutral country at a dinner party, he usually does so knowing that the neutral colleague also attends dinner parties with Westerners. The particular remark was contained in a directive sent to him by his Foreign Office. When it is studied in intelligence headquarters somewhere in the West and is found to agree in substance with a remark made by a Soviet military attaché at a cocktail party 10,000 miles away, the two remarks may erroneously be thought to confirm one another.

In reality both originated with the same master source in the Kremlin. Both Russians were acting as mouthpieces for an extremely well co-ordinated and well-timed program of political deception manipulated month by month in smooth conjunction with

the Soviets' ever-shifting aggressive probes and plots in Berlin, Laos, the Congo, Cuba and whatever is next on the program.

One of the most successful acts of long-range political deception ever launched against the West took place before and during World War II. It had the gullible in the West believing that the Chinese People's Movement was not Communistic but was solely a social and agrarian reform. This was not accomplished by open Communist propaganda. Instead the fiction was planted by means of Communist-controlled journalists in the Far East and various "front" or penetrated organizations.

Real Accidents Suspect

Any discussion of deception would be incomplete without mentioning how often the fear of being deceived has blinded an opponent to valid intelligence accidentally coming into his hands. If you suspect an enemy of constant trickery, then almost anything that happens can be taken as one of his tricks. A collateral effect of deception, once a single piece of deception has succeeded in its purpose, is to upset and confuse the opponent's judgment and evaluation of other intelligence he may receive. He will be suspicious and distrustful. He will not want to be caught off guard.

On January 10, 1940, during the "phony war," a German courier plane flying between two points in Germany lost its way in the clouds, ran out of fuel and made a forced landing in what turned out to be Belgium. On board were the complete plans of the German invasion of France through Belgium, for which Hitler had already given marching orders. When the *Luftwaffe* major who had been piloting the plane realized where he had landed, he quickly built a fire out of brush and tried to burn all the papers he had on board, but Belgian authorities reached him before he could finish the job and retrieved enough half-burned and unburned documents to be able to piece together the German plan.

Some of the high British and French officials who studied the material felt that the whole thing was a German deception operation. How could the Germans be so sloppy as to allow a small plane to go aloft so close to the Belgian border in bad weather with a completely detailed invasion plan on board? This reasoning focused on the circumstances, not on the contents of the papers. Churchill writes that he opposed this interpretation. Putting himself in the place of the German leaders, he asked himself what possible advantage there was in perpetrating a deception of this sort. Obviously, none. As we learned after the war, the invasion of Belgium, which had been set for the 16th of January—six days after the plane came down—was postponed by Hitler primarily because the plans had fallen into the Allies' hands.

The Ambassador's Valet

Accidents like this are not the only events that raise the spectre of deception. It has already been pointed out that if you send a deception agent to the enemy, you have to make him credible. Thus bona fide windfalls have sometimes been doubted and neglected because they were suspected of being deception. This happened to the Nazis late in World War II in the case of "Cicero," the Albanian valet of the British Ambassador to Turkey. He had succeeded in cracking the ambassador's private safe and had access to top secret British documents on the conduct of the war, and one day offered to sell them to the Germans as well as to continue supplying similar documents.

Some of Hitler's experts in Berlin could never quite believe that this wasn't a British trick, but for more complex reasons than in some cases where deception is feared. The incident is an excellent example of how prejudice and preconception can cause failure to properly evaluate valid intelligence. For one

thing, the Cicero documents gave evidence of the massive offensives to come and the growing power of the Allies—information which collided head on with the illusions cherished in the highest German circles. Secondly, competition and discord among different organs of the German government prevented it from making a sober analysis of this source. Particularly, the intelligence service under Himmler and Kaltenbrunner and the diplomatic service under Ribbentrop were at odds and, as a result, if Kaltenbrunner thought information was good, Ribbentrop automatically tended to think it was bad. An objective analysis of the operational data was out of the question in a situation where rival cutthroats were vying for position and prestige. In the Cicero case Ribbentrop and the diplomatic service suspected deception. The net effect was that, as far as can be ascertained, the Cicero material never had any appreciable influence on Nazi strategy. Of course, at this late date they did not have many alternatives open to them anyway.

A further ironical twist to this famous case is that the Nazi intelligence service paid this most valuable agent in counterfeit English pound notes, and he has been trying ever since to get restitution from the German government for services rendered—in real money.

Long History of Forgery

Certainly one of the most active agencies in the propagation of intentional deception is the office in the Soviet intelligence service (K.G.B.) called the disinformation section. In recent years this office has been particularly busy in formulating and distributing what purport to be official documents of the United States, Britain and other countries of the Free World. Its intention is to misstate and misrepresent the policies and purposes of these countries. In June of 1961 Richard Helms, a high official of the Central Intelligence Agency, presented the evidence of this activity to a congressional committee. Out of the mass of forgeries available, he selected 32 particularly succulent ones, which were fabricated in the period 1957–60.

He pointed out that the Russian secret service has a long history of forging documents, having concocted the Protocols of Zion over 60 years ago to promote anti-Semitism. The Soviets have been adept pupils of their tsarist predecessors. Their forgeries nowadays, he pointed out, are intended to discredit the West, and the United States in particular, in the eyes of the rest of the world; to sow suspicion and discord among the Western allies; and to drive a wedge between the peoples of non-Communist countries and their governments by promoting the notion that these governments are the puppets of the United States.

The falsified documents include various communications purporting to be from high officials to the President of the United States, letters to and from the Secretary of State or high State Department, Defense Department and USIA officials. To the initiated, these documents are patent fabrications; while the texts are cleverly conceived, there are always a great number of technical errors and inconsistencies. Unfortunately these are not apparent to the audiences for which the letters are intended, generally the peoples of the newly independent nations. The documents are prepared for mass consumption rather than for the elite. One of the most subtle, supposedly part of a British cabinet paper, wholly misrepresented the U.S. and British attitude with respect to trade-union policies in Africa.

The forgery technique is particularly useful to the Communists because they possess the means for wide and fast distribution. Newspapers and news outlets are available to them on a worldwide basis. While many of these are tarnished and suspect because of Communist affiliations, they are nevertheless capable of placing a fabrication before millions of people in a short time.

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US PLOT TO MURDER CHIANG

BLITZ

ASIA'S FOREMOST NEWSMAGAZINE
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TELEGRAM SENT

To: SECSTATE
WASHINGTON

Date: April 4, 1957

No: 508

Code: OTF

Charged to: Embassy

508, April 4, 5 p.m.

MOST IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET

Your telegram No. 1348 of April 2, 1957

At the present moment it would be rather difficult to carry out version No. 1, which you apparently prefer, owing to the lack of people in Gimmo's entourage whom we could trust completely. There is also no certainty that at the last moment some of the successors will not lose heart and tell Gimmo everything.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that Chiang Ching-kuo continues to retain complete control of the secret services. Preparations for version No. 1 might, therefore, be discovered by his agents. Chiang Ching-kuo's uncompromising character makes it likely that he would take immediate countermeasures and ruin the entire enterprise.

I consider therefore version No. 3 preferable, although its details must be more carefully worked out. Its execution will depend on proper timing if all suspicion is to be avoided. In any case I agree that a final decision should be taken as soon as possible.

Rankin

TELEGRAM SENT

To: SECSTATE
WASHINGTON

Date: April 9, 1957

No: 561

Code: OTF

Charged to: Embassy

561, April 9, 5:30 p.m.

MOST IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET

Latest reports from very reliable sources on the attitude of Gimmo's entourage indicate that the plan outlined in your telegram No. 1348 does not solve the problem.

In my opinion, it is necessary to go further and, besides Gimmo, take similar measures against the persons mentioned in my last report. These members of the old guard might seriously interfere with our plans. Representatives of the special services have fully shared this view.

Meanwhile we shall continue to "screen" officers and ensure the appointment of reliable individuals to positions in the Army and the Air Force. This has to some extent been done in the Navy already.

In view of the general opinion prevailing here I have drawn up certain measures to be taken before carrying out the actions authorized in your telegram No. 1348.

Rankin

Typical of documents forged for propaganda purposes and made public in media of popular circulation are these two spurious telegrams supposedly sent to the Secretary of State in Washington. Published in an English-language newspaper in the Far East, the documents alleged that American official agencies were plotting to assassinate Chiang-kai-Shek

The denials and the pinpointing of the evidence of fabrication ride so far behind the initial publication that the forgeries have already made their impact in spreading deception. On the other hand, the technique of forgery is not available to Western intelligence in peacetime, for, quite apart from ethical considerations, there is too much danger of deceiving and misleading our own people.

There is another type of deception that occasionally crops up which does not have its source with Communist intelligence services but which complicates the task of the Western intelligence officer and particularly the analyst. This deception is the product of what are called "papermills" in intelligence parlance. A papermill is a producer of phony intelligence, primarily for profit and not for the sake of the deception.

In the latter days of World War II and in the postwar era when thousands of the intelligentsia of eastern Europe were uprooted from their homes and sought refuge in the West they came to rely on their wits for a living. Many had had important posts in the countries they were forced to leave, and possessed wide education and knowledge of languages and peoples. Some of the less scrupulous among them found that an excellent way to make a living for a time was to fabricate intelligence reports based on supposed contacts with their homeland. These papermill fabrications could be cleverly conceived, well constructed and well

attuned to the desires of prospective purchasers and therefore almost impossible to reject at first glance. Many of them had a good market and brought a good price. Unfortunately for the fabricators, they were often too zealous in seeking more than one market for their product. In time—but it took much time and effort—U.S. and other intelligence services that had been victimized made a common drive to eliminate the papermills. The effort has been very largely successful.

VII. HOW INTELLIGENCE IS PUT TO USE

Information gathered by intelligence services is of little use unless it is got into the hands of its "consumers," the policy makers. This must be done in good time and in clear, intelligible form so that the particular intelligence can easily be read and properly related to the policy problem with which it deals.

These criteria are not easily met, for the sum total of intelligence received is immense. Thousands of items come into CIA headquarters every day, directly or through other agencies of government, particularly the State and Defense departments. When we consider all we need to know about happenings behind the Iron Curtain and in over a hundred other countries, this volume is not surprising. Anywhere in the world events could occur which might affect the security of the United States. How

is this mass of information handled by the State Department, the Defense Department and the CIA?

Between these three agencies there is immediate and often automatic exchange of important intelligence data. Of course, someone has to decide what "important" means and determine priorities. The sender of an intelligence report (who may be any one of our many officials abroad—diplomatic, military or intelligence) will often label it as being of a certain importance, but the question of priority is generally decided on the receiving end. If a report is of a particularly critical character, touching on the danger of hostilities or some major threat to our national security, the sender will place his message in channels that provide for automatic dissemination to the intelligence officers in the State and Defense departments and the CIA. The latter, as co-ordinator of foreign intelligence, has the right of access to all intelligence that comes to any department of our government. This is provided for by law.

There is a round-the-clock watch for important intelligence coming into the State and Defense departments and the CIA. During office hours (which in intelligence work are never normal), designated officers scan the incoming information for anything of critical character. Through the long night hours, special watch officers in the three agencies do the monitoring. They are in close touch with each other and come to know each other well, and are continually exchanging ideas about the sorting out of clues to any developing crisis. In the event that any dramatic item should appear in the incoming nightly stream of reports, arrangements have been made as to the notification of their immediate chiefs. The latter decide who among the high policy officials of government—from the President at the top to the responsible senior officers in State, Defense and the CIA—should be alerted. The watch officers also follow the press-service and radio reports, including those of Soviet and Chinese origin. News of a dramatic, yet open, character—the death of a Stalin, a revolt in Iraq, the assassination of a political leader—may first become known through public means of communication. Official channels today have access to the most speedy means of transmission of reports from our embassies and our overseas installations, but these messages must go through the process of being enciphered and deciphered. As a result, news flashes sometimes get through first.

Post-Mortem Analyses

After there has been an important incident affecting our security, one that has called for policy decisions and actions, there is usually an intelligence post-mortem to examine how effectively the available information was handled and how much forewarning had been given by intelligence. Incidents such as the Iraqi revolution of 1958 or the erecting of the wall dividing Berlin on August 13, 1961, required such treatment, since neither had been clearly predicted through intelligence channels. The purpose of the post-mortem is to obtain something in the nature of a batting average for the alertness of intelligence services. If there has been a failure, either in prior warning or in handling the intelligence already at hand, the causes are sought and every effort is made to find means of improving future performance.

The processing of incoming intelligence falls into three general categories. The first is the daily and hourly handling of current intelligence. The second is the researching of all available intelligence on a given series of subjects of interest to our policy makers; this might be given the name "basic intelligence." For example, one group of analysts may deal with the information available on the Soviet economy, another with its agriculture, a third with its steel and capital goods production, and still another with its aircraft and missile development. The third type of proc-

cessing is the preparation of an intelligence estimate and judgment based on the whole volume of information on the subject of the estimate.

Of course, there is not time to submit every important item to detailed analysis before it is distributed to the policy makers. But "raw" intelligence is a dangerous thing unless it is understood for what it generally is—an unevaluated report, frequently sent off without the originator of the message being able to determine finally its accuracy and reliability. Hence the policy makers who receive such intelligence in the form of periodic intelligence bulletins (or as an isolated message if its importance and urgency requires special treatment) are warned against acting on raw intelligence alone.

These bulletins—both daily and weekly—summarize on a world-wide basis the important new developments over the preceding hours or days; they include such appraisal as the sender may give or as the CIA is able to add in consultation with representatives of the other government intelligence agencies. These representatives meet frequently for that purpose, going over the items to be included in the daily bulletin. New information may still be added to the daily bulletin up until the early morning hours of the day on which it is issued. When this intelligence is sent forward, explanatory material is often included as to source, manner of acquisition and reliability. Some messages carry their own credentials as to authenticity; most do not.

Position Papers

In addition to the current raw intelligence reports and the "basic intelligence" studies, there are the position papers, generally called "national estimates." These are prepared by the intelligence community on the basis of all the intelligence available on a certain subject along with an interpretation of the "imponderables." Here we come to a most vital function of the entire work of intelligence—how to deal with the mass of information about future developments so as to make it useful to our policy makers and planners as they examine the critical problems of today and tomorrow. Berlin, Cuba, Laos; Communist aims and objectives; the Soviet military and nuclear programs; the economies of the U.S.S.R. and Communist China—the list could be almost indefinitely extended and is, of course, not exclusively concerned with Communist bloc matters. Sometimes estimates must be made on a crash basis. Sometimes, particularly where long-range estimates are involved, they are made after long weeks of study.

One of the major reasons why the CIA was organized was to provide a mechanism for co-ordinating intelligence work so that the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense could have before them a single reasoned analysis of the factors involved in situations affecting our national security. President Truman, who, in 1947, submitted the legislation proposing its creation, expressed in his memoirs the need for such a mechanism:

The war taught us this lesson—that we had to collect intelligence in a manner that would make the information available where it was needed and when it was wanted, in an intelligent and understandable form. If it is not intelligent and understandable, it is useless.

He also describes the system by which intelligence was co-ordinated and passed on to policy makers:

Each time the National Security Council is about to consider a certain policy—let us say a policy having to do with Southeast Asia—it immediately calls upon the CIA to present an estimate of the effects such a policy is likely to have. The Director of the CIA sits with the staff of the National Security Council and continually informs as they go along. The estimates he submits represent the judgment of the CIA and a cross section of the judgments of all the advisory councils of the CIA. These are G-2, A-2, the ONI, the State Department, the FBI, and the Director of Intelligence of the AEC. The Secretary of State then makes the final recommendation of policy, and the President makes the final decision.

What President Truman refers to as "all the advisory councils of the CIA" was established in 1950 as the Intelligence Advisory

Committee, which later became the Intelligence Board (USIB) and is often referred to as "the intelligence community." USIB now has an additional member to those listed above—the head of the newly created Defense Intelligence Agency, which co-ordinates the work of army, navy and air force intelligence and is playing an increasingly important role in the intelligence community. So too is the intelligence unit of the State Department, whose head ranks as an assistant secretary of state. The USIB meets regularly every week and more frequently during crises or whenever any vital new item of intelligence is received. The Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for the estimates arrived at by the board, but if any member dissents and desires his dissent to be recorded, a statement of his views is included as a footnote to the estimate that is finally presented to the President and interested members of the National Security Council.

To facilitate its work in making estimates, the CIA has set up the Board of National Estimates, on which sits a group of experts in intelligence, both civilian and military. The board has no fixed size or term of office but generally comprises about a dozen members. It is an integral and vital part of the agency, and its members are officials of the agency serving on a full-time basis. The military members are eminent retired officers who owe their allegiance to CIA and not to a particular military service. It is the duty of the board to prepare initial drafts of most estimates and to co-ordinate these drafts, at the working level, with representatives from the USIB membership. To deal with highly technical subjects, such as Soviet missiles, aircraft or nuclear programs, competent technical subcommittees of USIB have been established to work with the Board of National Estimates in making early drafts of estimates. And, in certain cases, experts outside of government may be consulted.

Bulganin's Missile Threat

Obviously, the procedure of making an initial draft, passing it on to the USIB, formulating the report along with any dissenting opinions, and finally submitting it, is a time-consuming process. There are times when "crash" estimates are needed on the spur of the moment. One of these occasions was the Suez crisis of November 1956. I had left Washington to go to my voting place in New York state when I was intercepted early on election eve by a telephone message from General Charles P. Cabell, deputy director of the CIA. He read to me a Soviet note that had just come over the wires. Bulganin was threatening London and Paris with missile attacks unless the British and French forces withdrew from Egypt. I asked General Cabell to call a meeting of the intelligence community and immediately flew back to Washington. The USIB met throughout the night, and early on election morning I took to President Eisenhower our agreed estimate of Soviet intentions and probable courses of action in this crisis.

The contents of this and other estimates are generally kept secret. However, the fact that this mechanism exists and can operate quickly should be a matter of public knowledge. It is an important cog in our national security machinery.

When, on October 22, 1962, President Kennedy addressed the nation on the secret Soviet build-up of intermediate-range missiles in Cuba, the intelligence community had already been receiving reports from agents and refugees indicating mysterious construction of some sort of bases in Cuba. It was a well-known fact that for some time past, Castro—or the Soviets purporting to be acting for Castro—had been installing a whole series of bases for ground-to-air missiles. These, however, were of short range and their major purpose apparently was to deal with possible intruding aircraft. Since the reports received came largely from persons who had little technical knowledge of missile de-

velopment, the CIA did not permit any conclusion to be drawn as to whether all the missiles were of the short-range type or whether something more sinister was involved.

The evidence that had been accumulated was sufficient, however, to alert the intelligence community to the need for a more scientific and precise analysis of what was going on. Reconnaissance flights were resumed and the concrete evidence obtained on which the President based his report to the nation and his action. This required, of course, not only the most careful intelligence analysis but immediate intelligence judgments. As the President stated, the air reconnaissance established beyond a doubt that more than antiaircraft installations were being constructed on Cuban soil. This was a case, incidentally, in which it was obviously necessary to give publicity to intelligence conclusions. Khrushchev's subsequent statements and actions testified to their accuracy.

A Sense of Urgency

Most of the estimating can be done on a more ordered basis than in such situations, although today there is a sense of urgency in the whole field of intelligence. Some estimates are requested by senior policy officers of government to guide them in dealing with particular problems before them or to get an idea of how others may react to a particular line of action we may be considering. Others are prepared on a regularly scheduled basis, as, for example, the periodic reports on Soviet military and technical preparations. Before some estimates are prepared, a hurry-up call is sent to those who collect the intelligence to try to fill certain gaps in the information required for a complete analysis of a particular problem. Such gaps might be in the military or economic information available, or in our knowledge of the intentions of a particular government at a particular time.

Few fields have proved more difficult of analysis than that of certain Soviet weapons systems. Here one has to deal with Soviet capabilities to produce a given system, the role assigned to the system by the military and its true priority in the whole military field. It is always difficult to predict how much emphasis will be given to any particular system until the research and development stage has been completed, the tests of effectiveness have been carried out and the factories have been given the order to proceed with actual production. While a Soviet system is still in its early stages, our estimates will stress capabilities and probable intentions; as hard facts become available, it is possible to give an estimate of the actual programming of the system.

In 1954, for example, there was evidence that the Soviet Union was producing long-range intercontinental heavy bombers comparable to our B-52s. At first, every indication pointed to the conclusion that the Russians were adopting this weapon as a major element of their offensive strength and planned to produce heavy bombers as fast as their economy and technology permitted. Certain estimates of the build-up of this bomber force over the next few years were called for by the Defense Department and were supplied by the intelligence community. These were based on knowledge of the Soviet aircraft manufacturing industry and the types of aircraft under construction, and included projections concerning the future rate of build-up on the basis of existing production rates and expected expansion of industrial capacity. There was hard evidence of Soviet capability to produce bombers at a certain rate if they so desired. At the time of the estimate, the available evidence indicated that they did so desire, and intended to translate this capability into an actual program. All this led to speculation in this country as to a "bomber gap."

Naturally, however, intelligence kept a close watch on events.

Production did not rise as rapidly as had seemed likely; evidence accumulated that the performance of the heavy bomber was less than satisfactory. At some point, probably about 1957, the Soviet leaders apparently decided to limit heavy bomber production drastically. The bomber gap never materialized. This became quite understandable, as evidence of progress in the Russian intercontinental missile program was then appearing and beginning to cause concern. Thus, while previous estimates of capability in bomber production remained valid, policy changes had necessitated a new estimate as to future developments in this particular system.

Intentions can be modified or even reversed, and intelligence estimates dealing with them can never be satisfactory. Witness how, just recently, our own intentions concerning the Skybolt missile have changed and how this must affect the calculations of Soviet intelligence.

The Soviet missile program, like that of the heavy bomber, had various vicissitudes. The Soviets saw early, probably earlier than we did, the significance of the missile as the weapon of the future and the potential psychological impact of space achievements. They saw this even before it was clear that a nuclear warhead could be so reduced in weight and size as to be deliverable over great distances by the big boosters which they correctly judged to be within the range of possibility. Given their geographical situation—their strategic requirements differ from ours—they soon realized that even a short- or medium-range missile would have great value in their program to dominate Europe.

Don't Underrate Soviets

The origins of the program go back to the end of World War II, when the Soviet Union, having carefully followed the progress made by the Germans with their V-1 and V-2 missiles, made every effort to gather together as much of the German developmental hardware and as many German rocket experts as they could get their hands on while they were conquering eastern Germany. The Soviets also hired a considerable number of German experts in addition to those they seized and forcibly deported.

It is a mistake, however, to credit Soviet missile proficiency today largely to the Germans. The Soviets themselves have a long history in this field and developed high competence quickly. They never took the Germans fully into their confidence but pumped them dry of knowledge, kept them a few years at the drawing boards and away from the testing areas, and then sent most of them back home. While these people proved to be a useful source of intelligence, they had never been brought into contact with the actual Soviet development and could tell only what they had themselves contributed.

The first decade after the end of the war was a period when we had only a scanty knowledge of Soviet missile progress. Drawing boards are silent and short-range missiles make little commotion. As the techniques of science were put to work and the U-2 photographs became available after 1956, "hard" intelligence began to flow into the hands of the impatient estimators. Their impatience was understandable, for great pressure had been put on them by those in the Department of Defense concerned with our own missile programs as well as with our own missile defenses. Planning in such a field takes years, and the Defense Department felt that this was a case in which it was justified in asking the intelligence community to project several years in advance the probable attainments of the Soviet program.

As in the earlier case of Soviet bomber production, the intelligence community, I am safe in saying, would be quite content if it were not called upon for such crystal-ball gazing. But our military planning requires estimates of this nature. The planners

say to the intelligence officers: If you won't give us some estimate as to the future, we will have to prepare it ourselves—but you intelligence officers should really be in a better position to make the predictions than we are. For the intelligence service to deny this would be tantamount to saying it was not up to its job.

Thus, early figures of Soviet missile production had to be developed on the basis of estimated production and development capabilities over a period in the future. Once again one had to decide how the Soviet Union would allocate its total military effort. How much of it would go into missiles? How much into developing the nuclear potential? How much into the heavy bomber, as well as the fighter planes and ground-to-air defense to meet hostile bombers? How much into submarines? And, in general, how much into elements of attack and how much into those of defense?

It was due to this measure of incertitude during the late 1950s that the national debate over the so-called missile gap developed. Then, on the basis of certain proved capabilities of the Russians and of estimates of their intentions and over-all strategy, conclusions were reached as to the numbers of missiles and nuclear warheads that would be available and on launchers several years in the future.

There is no doubt that tests of Soviet missiles in 1957 and afterward showed a high competence in the ICBM field. Soviet shots of seven to eight thousand miles into the far Pacific were well advertised and not ignored by our intelligence. Their testing in the intermediate fields must also have been gratifying to them. But would they use their bulky and somewhat awkward "first generation" ICBM—effective though it was—as the missile to deploy, or would they wait for a second or third generation? Were they in such a hurry to capitalize on a moment of possible missile superiority that they would sacrifice this to a more orderly program? The answer, in retrospect, seems to be in the negative, indicating that they chose the more orderly program. As soon as this evidence appeared, the ICBM estimates—as in the case of the bombers—were quickly revised downward.

Intelligence Good on Cuba

Today, after the Cuba incident, one may well ask whether present Soviet actions do not indicate a change of attitude toward their missile program. They were willing to take considerable risks to get some IRBM and MRBM bases in Cuba to create the equivalent, as a threat to us, of a considerable additional number of ICBM bases in the heartland of Russia. Now they seem to be more in a hurry.

In any event, the intelligence collected on Soviet missiles was excellent as to the nature and quality of the potential threat. Our intelligence was also both good and timely as to Soviet production of high-thrust engines and the work on Sputnik. And all of this intelligence spurred us to press forward with our own missile and space programs.

When one turns from the military to the political field, the problems for the estimators are often even more complex. Analysis of human behaviour and anticipation of human reactions in a given situation can never be assigned to a computer, and sometimes they baffle the most clever analyst.

More than a decade ago, in the autumn of 1950, this country had to face in North Korea the difficult decision of whether or not to push forward to the Yalu River and reunite Korea. If we did so, what would be the reaction of the Chinese Communists? Would they answer with a direct attack, or would they stay quiescent under certain conditions—if, for example, Korean rather than U.S. and UN troops formed the bulk of the advance or if we did not disturb the Chinese sources of electric power in North Korea?

At that time, we had good intelligence as to the location and strength of the Chinese Communist forces on the far side of the Yalu. We had to guess, or to put it better, estimate the intentions of Moscow and Peking. We were not in on their secret councils and decisions. In such cases it is arrogant, as well as dangerous, for the intelligence officer to venture a firm opinion in the absence of telltale information on the positioning and moving of troops, the bringing up of strategic supplies and the like. I can speak with detachment about the 1950 estimates, for these were made just before I joined the CIA. The conclusions of the estimators were that it was a toss-up, but they leaned to the side that under certain circumstances the Chinese would probably not intervene. In fact, we just did not know what the Chinese Communists would do, and we did not know how far the Soviet Union would press them or agree to support them if they moved.

One cannot assume that a Communist leader will act or react as we would. For example, normally one would not have "estimated" that Khrushchev should choose the opening day of the Unaligned Nations Conference at Belgrade in September of 1961 to announce to the world, without forewarning, that he was breaking the gentleman's agreement on suspension of nuclear testing. Yet, this is exactly what he did. In Cuba in October of 1962 Khrushchev presumably "estimated" that he could sneak his missiles into the island, plant them and camouflage them and then, at a time of his own choosing, face the United States with a *fait accompli*. Certainly here he misestimated, just as some on our side had misestimated, that, because of the risks involved and the difficulty of maintaining secrecy, Khrushchev would not attempt to place offensive weapons in Cuba, right under our nose.

Whenever a dramatic event occurs in the foreign relations field—an event for which the public may not have been prepared—one can usually count on the cry going up, "Intelligence has failed again." As we have seen, the charge may at times be correct. But there are also many occasions when an event has been foreseen and correctly estimated but intelligence has been unable to advertise its success, at least at the time.

Intelligence Knew of Suez

This was true of the Suez invasion of 1956. Here, intelligence was well alerted as to both the possibility and later the probability of the actions taken by Israel and then by Britain and France. The public received the impression that there had been an intelligence failure; statements were issued by U.S. officials to the effect that the country had not been given advance warning of the action. Our officials, of course, intended to imply only that the British and French and Israelis had failed to tell us what they were doing. In fact, United States intelligence had kept the government informed without, as usual, advertising its achievement.

On other occasions the press and the public have been mistaken about the actual role of intelligence in certain situations. Having reached their conclusions about what the intelligence estimate must have been in the light of the official action taken, they have proceeded to attack the intelligence services even though, in fact, there had been no such estimate made. Take, for example, Bay of Pigs episode in 1961. Much of the American press assumed at the time that this action was predicated on a mistaken intelligence estimate to the effect that a landing would touch off a widespread and successful popular revolt in Cuba. Those who had worked, as I had, with the anti-Hitler underground behind the Nazi lines in France and Italy and in Germany itself during World War II, and those who watched the tragedy of the Hungarian patriots in 1956, would have realized that spontaneous revolutions by unarmed people in this modern age are ineffective and often disastrous. While I have never discussed any details of the 1961 Cuban operation and do not propose to do so here, I repeat now what I

how said publicly before. I believe a spontaneous uprising of the unarmed population of Cuba would ensue.

Clearly, our intelligence estimates must take into account not only the natural and the usual but also the unusual, the brutal, the unexpected. It is no longer wise to estimate actions and reactions on the basis of what we ourselves might do if we were in Khrushchev's shoes because, as we have seen at the United Nations, he takes off his shoes. Very often Russian policy moves seem almost to be based on the ideas of Ivan Petrovich Pavlov, the noted Russian physiologist who died in 1936. His experiments included inducing certain reflexes in animals and then, by abruptly changing the treatment, reducing the animals to a state of confusion. The Pavlovian touch can be seen in Khrushchev's abrupt changes in attitude and action, intended to give rise to confusion and dismay in his adversary. The scuttling of the Paris Summit meeting in 1960, the surprise resumption of nuclear testing just at the time the nonaligned nations were assembling in Belgrade in 1961, even the famous shoe-thumping episode, were staged so that their shock effect would help produce certain results he desired. He probably hoped for the same shock effects from the missiles in Cuba. Estimates on how Khrushchev will act in a given situation should take this characteristic into account.

Of course, the trouble with estimating is that one rarely has knowledge of all the factors bearing on any given situation. No one can clearly foresee the future or predict with assurance the workings of the minds of the leaders whose decisions make history. As a matter of fact, if we were to set out to estimate what our own policy decisions would be a few years hence, we would soon be lost in a forest of uncertainty. And yet our estimators are called upon to decide what others will do. Unfortunately the intelligence process of making estimates will never become an exact science.

But at least progress has been made in assembling the elements of a given situation in an orderly manner so as to assist our planners and policy makers. It is possible, often, to indicate a range of probabilities or possibilities and to isolate those factors which would influence Kremlin or Peking decisions. In any event, we have come a long way since Pearl Harbor and the somewhat haphazard system of intelligence analysis which prevailed at that time.

VIII. INTELLIGENCE IN OUR FREE SOCIETY

From time to time the charge is made that an intelligence or security service is a potential threat to our freedoms and that there is something sinister about the secrecy surrounding its operations that is inconsistent with the workings of a free society. There has been some sensational writing about the CIA's supposedly making national policy on its own, and playing fast and loose with its secret funds. The Soviet Union and its Communist allies have persistently mounted the most vicious attacks on U.S. intelligence by means of press, radio and other means of communication. Many of these attacks occur in non-Communist media and are not immediately recognizable as of Communist origin. Innocently or otherwise, many writers, especially on the left, have taken up the refrain and, at times, more conservative publicists have been misled into repeating a good deal of Communist propaganda on the subject. Of course, I have taken Communist attacks as a compliment and a measure of our adversaries' fear of the CIA.

I have already pointed out that in both tsarist and Soviet Russia, in Germany, in Japan under the war lords and in certain other countries, security services that exercised some intelligence functions were used to help a tyrant or a totalitarian society to suppress freedoms at home and to carry out terrorist operations abroad. This fact has added to the confusion of many about the

exact function of an intelligence service. Quite recently, from a rather unexpected quarter, comes a comment by Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas. He suggests that "the press does not cover the operations of the Pentagon adequately, nor can it report truthfully on the C.I.A.," which, he alleges, generates "policies," the dangers of which "are not known even to many of the informed press." (*Freedom of the Mind*, American Library Association, Chicago, Ill. [1962], p. 8.) It is understandable, of course, that a relatively new organization in our government's structure, like the CIA, should—despite its desire for anonymity—receive more than its share of publicity and be subject to questioning and to attack.

Harry Howe Ransom, who has written a study of our intelligence service in relation to the nation's security, puts the issue this way:

CIA is the indispensable gatherer and evaluator of world-wide facts for the National Security Council. Yet to most persons CIA remains a mysterious, super-secret, shadow agency of government. Its invisible role, its power and influence, and the secrecy enshrouding its structure and operations, raise important questions regarding its place in the democratic process. One such question is: How shall a democracy insure that its secret intelligence apparatus becomes neither a vehicle for conspiracy nor a suppressor of the traditional liberties of democratic self-government? (*Central Intelligence and National Security*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. [1958], p. vi.)

I propose to answer this and other questions and criticisms. In fact, in writing this article, I have been motivated by the desire to put intelligence in our free society in its proper perspective.

As already indicated, CIA is a publicly recognized institution of government. Its duties, its place in our governmental structure and the controls surrounding it are set forth partly by statute and partly under National Security Council directive. It was set up under an act of Congress on the recommendation of the President after exhaustive congressional hearings and with practically unanimous bipartisan support. The law specifically provides "that the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions." It does not make policy, and all its actions must be consistent with the government's policy and approved by those responsible for that policy. Like the State and Defense departments, it has certain publicly assigned functions. Also like these departments, it must keep much of its work secret.

It Can't Happen Here

This country certainly wants no part of an organization like the Okhrana of the tsars or the N.K.V.D. of Stalin or the K.G.B. of Khrushchev. We have been nauseated by what we have read of Himmler's *Sicherheitsdienst* and by the military secret service of Japan in pre-World War II days. The very nature of our government and of our society under the Constitution and the Bill of Rights would outlaw such organizations as these. They could never take root in this country. But even if these factors were not enough, there is a whole group of safeguards, both legal and practical, surrounding the work of the CIA.

The Central Intelligence Agency is placed directly under the National Security Council, which, in effect, means that it is under the President. The chief executive himself, therefore, has the responsibility for overseeing the operations of the CIA. The National Security Council directives are issued under the authority of the National Security act of 1947, which provides that, in addition to the duties and functions specifically assigned under law, the CIA is further empowered to

perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally . . . perform such other functions and duties relating to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

It is the President who selects and the Senate which confirms the director and the deputy director of the agency, and this choice is no routine affair. In the 15 years since the agency was

created, the following have served as directors: (1) General Roscoe Henry Hillenkoetter, who had distinguished service in the navy and in naval intelligence; (2) General Walter Bedell Smith, who, in addition to an outstanding military career, had been for almost three years U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union and was later an undersecretary of state; (3) myself, about whom any comment here would be out of place, except for the mention of a long period of government service and many years in intelligence work; (4) John A. McCone, the present director, who has performed outstanding service in both the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations in many important government posts—as a member of the President's Air Policy Commission, as a deputy to the Secretary of Defense, as undersecretary of the air force, and then as chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

The law provides that a civilian must be either in the position of director or deputy director. While, theoretically, it is possible to have both of these jobs in civilian hands, military men cannot fill both positions as the law now stands. The practice over the past decade has been to split them between a military man and a civilian. The last two directors, both civilians, have had highly experienced military men for deputy directors—General Charles Pearre Cabell during my tenure, and now Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter under John McCone.

I have gone into these details about the backgrounds of those in positions of leadership in the CIA because one has a right to expect from such men the highest degree of integrity and responsibility.

Relations with the President

From my own experience in the agency, under three presidents, I can say with certainty that the chief executive takes a deep and continuing interest in the operations of the agency. During 8 of my 11 years as deputy director and director of the CIA, I served under President Eisenhower. I had many talks with him about the day-to-day workings of the agency, particularly concerning the handling of its funds. I recall his telling me that we should set up procedures in the agency for the internal accounting of unvouchered funds, *i.e.*, funds appropriated by Congress and expendable on the signature of the director, which would be even more searching, if that were possible, than those of the General Accounting Office. While, obviously, many expenditures must be kept secret as far as the public is concerned, the CIA always stands ready to account to the President, to the CIA appropriations subcommittees of Congress and to the Bureau of the Budget for every penny expended, whatever its purpose.

During the earlier years of the agency there was a series of special investigations of its activities. I myself was the head of a committee of three that in 1949 reported to President Truman on CIA operations. There were also studies made under the auspices of two Hoover commissions, one in 1949 and one in 1955. These dealt with the organization of the executive branch of government and included studies on our intelligence structure. The latter survey, conducted in 1955 during my directorship, included a report prepared by a task force under the leadership of General Mark W. Clark; at about the same time, a special survey of certain of the more secret operations of the agency was prepared for President Eisenhower by a task force under General James Doolittle. It is interesting to note that General Clark's task force, expressing concern over the dearth of intelligence data from behind the Iron Curtain, called for "aggressive leadership, boldness and persistence." We were urged to do more, not less—the U-2 was already on the drawing boards and was to fly within the year.

Following the report of the 1955 Hoover Commission, I discussed with President Eisenhower one of the commission's rec-

commendations that there should be established a presidential watchdog board staffed by civilians. This would take the place of *ad hoc* investigation committees from time to time. President Eisenhower agreed completely with this recommendation and appointed a "President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities," the chairman of which for some time was the distinguished head of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, James R. Killian, Jr. President Kennedy, shortly after he took office, reconstituted this committee with a slightly modified membership, but again under the chairmanship of Dr. Killian. The files, the records, the activities and the expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency are open to this presidential committee, which meets several times a year and whose recommendations and advice I found of inestimable value in my work.

A "Watchdog" Considered

The other recommendation of the Hoover Commission in this connection—that a congressional watchdog committee should also be considered—has had a somewhat more stormy history. In 1953, even before the Hoover recommendations, Senator Mike Mansfield had introduced a bill to establish a joint congressional committee for the CIA, somewhat along the lines of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. On August 25, 1953, he wrote me a letter to inquire about CIA's relations with Congress and asked the agency's views on the resolution he had submitted. In my absence abroad, General Cabell, my deputy, replied that "the ties of the CIA with the Congress are stronger than those which exist between any other nation's intelligence service and its legislative body."

A few years later this issue came to a vote in the Senate in the form of a concurrent resolution sponsored by Senator Mansfield. It had considerable support, as 35 senators from both parties were co-sponsors and the resolution had been reported out favourably by the Senate Rules Committee in February of 1956, but one vote of strong dissent came from Senator Carl Hayden, who was also the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee. Senator Hayden was supported by Senator Richard Russell, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and by Senator Leverett Saltonstall, the senior Republican member of that Committee. In April the Senate, after a most interesting debate, voted against the watchdog committee resolution by a surprisingly large majority. In opposing the resolution, Senator Russell said: "Although we have asked him [Allen W. Dulles] very searching questions about some activities which it almost chills the marrow of a man to hear about, he has never failed to answer us forthrightly and frankly in response to any questions we have asked him." The issue was decided when this testimony was supported by former Vice-President (then Senator) Alben Barkley, who spoke from his experience as a member of the National Security Council. He was joined in opposition by Senator Stuart Symington, who had intimate knowledge of the workings of the agency from his days as Secretary of the Air Force. On the final vote of 59 to 27, 10 of the measure's original co-sponsors reversed their positions and joined with the majority to defeat the proposal. They had heard enough to persuade them that, for the time being at least, the measure was not needed.

Congress Holds Purse Strings

Possibly the strongest argument against a special congressional watchdog committee is the fact that procedures have been set up—and have been functioning well for almost a decade—whereby Congress exercises its legislative control over what is, after all, very distinctly a function of the executive branch. Congress, of course, holds the purse strings and, through the House and Senate Armed Services committees, also oversees legislative and other requirements of the agency. Appropria-

tion is not a function of the executive branch, but a certain amount of control over the scope of operations—how many people CIA can employ; how much it can do; and, to some extent, even what it can do. Obviously, the entire CIA budget cannot be thrown open to general knowledge either in Congress or in the executive branch. But any general public impression that the senators and representatives can exert no power over the CIA is quite mistaken.

The procedures for dealing with the CIA budget are worked out by the Congress itself. Even before a congressional subcommittee sees the CIA budget, moreover, there is a review by the Bureau of the Budget, which must approve the amount set aside for it. This, of course, includes presidential approval. Then the budget is considered by a subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee of the House, as is the case with other executive departments and agencies. The only difference is that the amount of the CIA budget is not publicly disclosed outside of the subcommittee hearings.

This subcommittee includes three members of the majority and two members of the minority from the Appropriations Committee. The present chairman of the committee, Clarence Cannon, is also chairman of the CIA appropriations subcommittee. Until his recent retirement, the senior minority member of the subcommittee was John Taber. Two men with longer experience in congressional procedure and two more careful watchdogs of the public treasury could hardly be found. This subcommittee is entitled to see everything it wishes to see with regard to the CIA budget and to have as much explanation of expenditures, past and present, as it desires.

All this was clearly brought out in a dramatic statement that Mr. Cannon made on the floor of the House on May 10, 1960, just after the failure of the U-2 flight of Francis Gary Powers:

The plane was on an espionage mission authorized and supported by money provided under an appropriation recommended by the House Committee on Appropriations and passed by the Congress.

He then referred to the fact that the appropriation and the activity had also been approved and recommended by the Bureau of the Budget and, like all such expenditures and operations, was under the aegis of the chief executive. He discussed the authority of the subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee to recommend an appropriation for such purposes and also the fact that these activities had not been divulged to the House and to the country. He recalled the circumstances during World War II when billions of dollars were appropriated, through the Manhattan project, for the atomic bomb under the same general safeguards as in the case of the U-2, *i.e.*, on the authority of a subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee. He referred to the widespread espionage by the Soviet Union, to the activities of their spies in stealing the secret of the atomic bomb. Alluding to the surprise attack by the Communists in Korea in 1950, he justified the U-2 operation in these words:

Each year we have admonished . . . the CIA that it must meet situations of this character with effective measures. We told them "This must not happen again and it is up to you to see that it does not happen again" . . . and the plan that they were following when this plane was taken, is their answer to that demand.

He took occasion to commend the CIA for its action in sending reconnaissance planes over the Soviet Union for the four years preceding Powers' capture and concluded:

We have here demonstrated conclusively that free men, confronted by the most ruthless and criminal despotism, can under the Constitution of the United States protect this Nation and preserve world civilization.

I cite this merely to show the extent to which even the most secret of the CIA's intelligence operations have, under appropriate safeguards, been laid before the representatives of the people in Congress.

In addition to the scrutiny of CIA activities by the House

Appropriations Committee, there is also a subcommittee in the House Armed Services Committee. The chairman of this subcommittee is Carl Vinson, who for years has been head of the Armed Services Committee itself. To this body the agency reports its current operations to the extent and in whatever detail the committee desires; here the interest lies not so much with the financial aspects of operations as with all the other elements of our work. In the Senate, there are comparable subcommittees of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees.

Fifteen years ago, when the legislation to set up a central intelligence agency was being considered, the congressional committees working on the matter sought my views. In addition to testifying, I submitted a memorandum, published in the record of the proceedings, in which I proposed that a special advisory body for the new agency should be constituted to include representatives of the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. This group should, I proposed, "assume the responsibility for advising and counseling the Director of Intelligence and assure the proper liaison between the Agency and these two Departments and the Executive." This procedure has been followed.

Open to Public Criticism

Of course, the public and the press remain free to criticize the actions taken by intelligence, including those which are exposed by mishap or indiscretion. This holds just as true for intelligence activities as for any government operations, except where the national security is involved. When an intelligence operation goes wrong and publicity results, the intelligence agency and particularly its director must stand ready to assume responsibility wherever that is possible. There have been times, as in the cases of the U-2 descent on Soviet territory and the Cuban affair of April 1961, where the chief executive has publicly assumed responsibility. Here, if the CIA had attempted to take the position that it had planned and carried out the action unguided and alone it would have been tantamount to admitting that the executive branch of the government was not on the job. Of course, in intelligence operations, silence is the best policy where silence is possible. It is not possible when it cannot be maintained without calling into grave question the vigilance of the executive.

There are many safeguards prescribed within the agency itself to protect against its meddling in policy matters. In addition, the established practice is that no one in the agency, from the director on down, may engage in political activities of any nature, except to vote. A resignation is immediately accepted—or demanded—whenever this rule is violated; any member with political aspirations is given to understand that re-employment—in case his plunge into the political arena is unsuccessful—is unlikely.

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Those are some of the safeguards—executive, legislative and other—which surround our intelligence work and help to ensure that the CIA under our government operates solely within established policies.

In the last analysis, however, the most important safeguards are the kind of leadership the intelligence service has and the character of the people who work for it. The efficacy of our laws and regulations depends upon the respect of our citizens for them, as well as upon the courts which enforce them. The hopes or fears which our citizens may have with regard to U.S. intelligence and its operations must centre on the integrity of those on the job—their respect for the democratic processes and their sense of duty and devotion in carrying out their important and delicate tasks.

After ten years of service, I can testify that I have never seen a group of men and women more devoted to the defense of our country and its way of life than those who are working in the Central Intelligence Agency. Our people do not go into the intelligence service for reasons of financial reward or because the service can give them, in return for their work, high rank or public acclaim. Their accomplishments must remain, as President Kennedy has remarked, largely unsung. They are there because of the fascination of the work and the belief that through their service they can personally make a contribution to our nation's security. Most of the senior officers have had long years of service; the new recruits, from whose ranks the agency of the future will be built, are chosen with utmost care and given thorough training before they begin work.

No More Controls Needed

I do not believe that there is need for more controls on our intelligence work. Rather, one should stress the need for all of us to be more alert, more aggressively prepared to meet the requirements of this age. It is not by our intelligence organization that our liberties will be threatened, but rather by our failure to understand the nature of the dangers facing us throughout the world today. If we have more Cubas, if some of the countries of the non-Communist world that are in jeopardy today are further weakened, then we could well be isolated and our liberties, too, could be threatened.

We understand the military threat in the age of nuclear missiles, and we are spending billions—properly so—to counter it. It is the invisible war that we must meet—Khrushchev's wars of liberation, the subversive threats orchestrated by the Soviet Communist party with all its ramifications and fronts, supported by the vigorous penetration activities of secret agents and espionage. We cannot afford to put intelligence in chains; we must continue to support it and enable it to play its protective and informative role in preparing us to meet the dangers unique to this era.